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ABSTRACT
It is no secret that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one of
the most significant pieces of legislation ever passed by the United States
Congress. Fiercely debated and enacted during the Civil Rights Movement
of the 1960s, Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in various forms
of discrimination within the workplace. For instance, employers may not
unlawfully consider race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
employment decisions. Given Bostock v. Clayton County’s recent
extension of Title VII’s protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and queer workers, this Article posits that evaluating Caucasian workers’
“reverse discrimination” claims is the next great battle to ensue under Title
VII. The United States Supreme Court rightly observed that Title VII’s
protections apply with equal force to Caucasians. But there is an absence
of Court precedent, accompanied with conflicting views among the federal
appellate courts, about how Caucasians prove their reverse discrimination
claims under Title VII. The federal appellate courts’ lack of consensus
results from the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, which permits a plaintiff to establish a rebuttable inference
of discrimination through a prima facie case. The prima facie case initially
requires a showing of one’s racial minority status. Observing the obvious
issue of Caucasians not being racial minorities, some federal courts require
Caucasians to instead provide “background circumstances” or “sufficient
evidence” for a prima facie case. Others entirely reject the background
circumstances requirement and permit Caucasians to proceed similarly to
racial minorities. Noticeably, the background circumstances test has not
been imposed upon racial minorities. This Article critiques and justifies
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the background circumstances test for reverse discrimination claims on
historical, legal, and theoretical bases but recognizes it raises
constitutional concerns under equal protection jurisprudence. This Article
then explores constitutional resolutions to the background circumstances
test but concludes that the judge-made doctrine should be abandoned to
completely insulate Title VII from judicial review. As a final observation,
this Article examines the consequences of eradicating the background
circumstances requirement and replacing it with a holistic assessment of
the prima facie case.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................1067
I. TITLE VII’S HISTORICAL ENACTMENT AND
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION..................................................................1072
A. House Action of H.R. 7152..........................................................1073
B. Senate Action of H.R. 7152 .........................................................1076
C. Return to the House, Presidential Signature, and Legislative
Lessons.............................................................................................1080
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPLICATION OF TITLE VII......................1081
A. McDonnell Douglas and Its Progeny: The Source
of Confusion .....................................................................................1082
B. McDonald’s Expansion of Title VII’s Reach ..............................1087
C. Ricci’s Recent Approach to Reverse Discrimination
Under Title VII.................................................................................1090
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH &
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS ...........................................................1094
A. The Background Circumstances Test in the Shadow of McDonnell
Douglas ............................................................................................1095
B. Other Applications of the Background Circumstances Test .......1102
C. The Rejection of the Background Circumstances Test and a
Protected-Class Requirement ..........................................................1106
D. The Sufficient Evidence Approach for Reverse Discrimination
Plaintiffs...........................................................................................1108
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS TO THE
BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES TEST FOR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS ................................................................................................1109
A. Justifications for a Heightened Burden on Reverse Discrimination
Claimants .........................................................................................1109
B. Constitutional Issues, Defenses, and Resolutions .......................1111
C. A New Path Forward for Reverse Discrimination Claims .........1116
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING THE BACKGROUND
CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH ..............................................................1119
A. Preserving Title VII’s Focus .......................................................1119

2021]

The Confusion of McDonnell Douglas

1067

B. Enhancing Judicial Confidence ..................................................1121
CONCLUSION........................................................................................1122
INTRODUCTION
Racial discrimination within the workplace is unlawful under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).1 This is an unremarkable
proposition likely finding unanimous support among attorneys, law
students, legal academics, and jurists. Under Title VII, another
uncontroversial proposition is plaintiffs may pursue employment
discrimination claims2 using a burden-shifting framework laid down in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.3 McDonnell Douglas allows
plaintiffs to establish a rebuttable presumption of race discrimination
through a prima facie case showing:
(i) [T]hat he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. 4

If plaintiffs establish the presumption, plaintiffs’ former employers
may rebut it with evidence of a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for
their adverse decision.5 After employers proffer a reason, plaintiffs can
then overcome it by proving the reason is a pretext for unlawful
discrimination, meaning that the employers’ purported legitimate,

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”).
2. Title VII provides recourse for two types of claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
“Disparate-treatment cases present ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination[.]’” Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). Disparate treatment claims assert “an employer has ‘treated [a] particular
person less favorably than others because of’ a protected trait.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988)). Those claims are authorized by
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Disparate impact claims seek to eradicate “[employment] practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). These claims were later added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)).
This Article addresses how Caucasians establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment claims.
3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. Id. at 802.
5. Id.
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nondiscriminatory reason is false and a shield for discriminatory animus.6
Plaintiffs always retain the burden of persuasion during the burdenshifting inquiry and must show intentional discrimination. 7
These principles are firmly rooted in Title VII law and widely
employed by litigants in countless cases, yet there remains widespread
disagreement about how Caucasians establish a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas’s original formulation.8 The problem is generated by
the racial minority prong.9 In subsequent cases, the United States Supreme
Court held that Title VII applies to Caucasians10 using the “same
standards”11 developed for African-Americans.12
Seemingly bucking the Court’s preference for the “same standards”
among Title VII claimants, some federal courts require Caucasians to
establish a prima facie case by providing “background circumstances” or
6. Id. at 804; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143–44 (2000);
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).
7. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
8. See Frederick v. City of Portland, No. 95–35389, 1996 WL 583641, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 10,
1996) (“Currently, there is a circuit split concerning requirements for a prima facie case of reverse
race discrimination.”); Lucas v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532, 534 n.9 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing the D.C.
Circuit imposes a higher standard upon Caucasians and “[o]ther courts have refused to apply a higher
burden”). Compare Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (employing the
background circumstances test to a Caucasian’s prima facie case), and Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150,
153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same), and Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017–18 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (same), with Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158–61 (3d Cir. 1999) (employing a
“sufficient evidence” test for Caucasians alleging disparate treatment), and Smith v. Lockheed-Martin
Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the background circumstances
requirement).
9. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
10. In this Article, the author uses “Caucasian” to refer to individuals of the majority race, while
“African-American” refers to individuals of the minority race. But see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When
Different Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the
McDonnell Douglas Prima Face Case Test, 50 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 53, 53 n.1 (1999) (“[Angela
Onwuachi-Willig] uses the term ‘Whites’ throughout this Article to refer to members of the majority
race and uses the term ‘Blacks’ to refer to members of the black race. This author prefers the term
‘Blacks’ to the term ‘African Americans’ because she believes that the term ‘Blacks’ is more
inclusive.”). The author further uses “Caucasian” and “African-American” to conform with recent
terms used by the Supreme Court and recognizes the Court has also used the terms “white” and
“black.” See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207, 2212 (2016) (using the terms
“Caucasian,” “African-American,” “Asian-American,” and “Hispanic” for accessing an affirmative
action program under the Fourteenth Amendment); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)
(using the terms “black,” “Hispanic,” and “white” in a Title VII analysis). The author further
recognizes there are other minorities within the United States of America, including, but not limited
to, Asians, Hispanics, Native-Americans, etc. See KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A. JONES & ROBERTO
R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2010BR-02, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010,
at 3 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CLH9JJE].
11. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
12. Id. at 278–85.
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“sufficient evidence” of race discrimination, substituting for McDonnell
Douglas’s racial minority prong.13 These federal courts justify a
heightened burden for Caucasians because the “light of common
experience”14 compels a higher evidentiary burden for “reverse
discrimination”15 claims as discrimination against the majority is rare and
unusual.16
Other federal courts reject alterations to McDonnell Douglas’s
framework for Caucasians.17 They largely reason that imposing a
heightened requirement solely on Caucasians is discriminatory itself and
at odds with the Court’s decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.18 They further lambast the background circumstances
standard as developing an amorphous, unworkable standard for federal
courts to use for resolving reverse discrimination claims. Under this view,
McDonnell Douglas’s racial minority prong becomes a nullity and
formality of standing.19

13. See Ashcroft, 383 F.3d at 724; Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 158–61; Harding, 9 F.3d at 153–54;
Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017–18; see also Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 794 F.3d 899, 903
(8th Cir. 2015); Farr v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 570 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2009); Zambetti
v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2002); Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d
585, 588–89 (10th Cir. 1992); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 11 (Kris Markarian ed., 5th ed. 2012) (“The first element,
membership in a minority group, simply does not apply to claims of reverse discrimination.”).
14. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
15. For ease, this Article uses the term “reverse discrimination” to classify claims brought by
racial majorities, i.e., Caucasians. Its use of “reverse discrimination” is mirrored by others. See Peter
Gene Baroni, Note, Background Circumstances: An Elevated Standard of Necessity in Reverse
Discrimination Claims Under Title VII, 39 HOW. L.J. 797, 797 n.4 (1996); Shirley W. Bi, Note, RaceBased Reverse Employment Discrimination Claims: A Combination of Factors to the Prima Face
Case for Caucasian Plaintiffs, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE-NOVO 40, 41–42 (2016); David Michael
McConnell, Comment, Title VII at Twenty–The Unsettled Dilemma of “Reverse” Discrimination, 19
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1983); Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The
Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1031, 1033–34 (2004); Janice C. Whiteside, Note, Title VII and Reverse Discrimination: The Prima
Facie Case, 31 IND. L. REV. 413, 413 n.2 (1998).
16. Parker, 652 F.2d at 220.
17. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011); Byers v. Dall.
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th
Cir. 1991); Young v. City of Hous., 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990); Metoyer v. Am. Eagle Airlines,
Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917–18 (W.D. La. 2011); McGarity v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, No. 3:96–CV–
3413–R, 1998 WL 50460, at *3 n.24 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998); Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 824 F.
Supp. 677, 683–84 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
18. Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 158; Barella v. Village of Freeport, 16 F. Supp. 3d 144, 159–61
(E.D.N.Y. 2014); Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 636, 640–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Collins v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo., 727 F. Supp. 1318, 1319–23 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
19. See Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1325 n.15; Young, 906 F.2d at 180; Bi, supra note
15, at 54; Ryan Mainhardt & William Volet, Note, The First Prong’s Effect on the Docket: How the
Second Circuit Should Modify the McDonnell Douglas Framework in Title VII Reverse Discrimination
Claims, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 219, 239 (2012).
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The lack of Supreme Court guidance concerning reverse
discrimination claims has not only led to differing views among the federal
courts but also among legal commentators.20 At one end of the spectrum,
some fully defend the background circumstances requirement,
emphasizing the need for a different prima facie case for Caucasians and
contending that the requirement truly honors McDonnell Douglas’s
mandates.21 On the other end, others support eradicating the requirement,
focusing on its discriminatory nature and the unfair retribution it imposes
upon Caucasians who have not discriminated against minority groups.22 In
the middle, only one commentator supports the doctrine but proposes
eliminating formal proof structures after examining the doctrine’s
constitutionality.23
This Article attempts to resolve the confusion surrounding reverse
discrimination claims pursued under McDonnell Douglas, which is likely
the next great battle to ensue under Title VII, especially after its recent
extension to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer workers and the
shifting demographic makeup of the country.24 Given the Supreme Court’s
20. Compare Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs
Under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure that
Separate is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 1023 (2000) (suggesting modifying the background
circumstances requirement to “ensure that non-minorities enjoy equal and adequate protection under
Title VII”), and Whiteside, supra note 15, at 432–36 (arguing for the elimination of the background
circumstances approach), with Baroni, supra note 15, at 812 (stating that the background
circumstances standard “preserves the intent of Title VII at the prima facie level”), and OnwuachiWillig, supra note 10, at 71–80 (arguing that the background circumstances test “level[s] the playing
field” between African-Americans and Caucasians).
21. See Baroni, supra note 15, at 810–12; Bi, supra note 15, at 49; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note
10, at 81.
22. See Bi, supra note 15, at 58–62; Giordano, supra note 20, at 1020; Whiteside, supra note 15,
at 434. Cf. Scott Black, McDonnell Douglas’ Prima Facie Case and the Non-Minority Plaintiff: Is
Modification Required?, 1 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 309, 349–53 (1994) (arguing against the background
circumstances test because it does not consider the impact of affirmative action and minorities’ new
societal status).
23. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1098–129.
24. The Supreme Court recently resolved a circuit split by extending Title VII’s protections to
workers identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ). Bostock v. Clayton
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738, 1754 (2020) (resolving a circuit split among the federal circuits and
holding that LGBTQ workers may pursue claims under Title VII). This recent development evidences
the Court’s willingness to settle unresolved issues under Title VII, especially when there are differing
views among the appellate courts impacting workers’ substantive rights. See generally SUP. CT. R.
10(a) (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for
a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court
considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter . . . .” (emphasis added)); Karen
M. Gebbia, Circuit Splits and Empiricism in the Supreme Court, 36 PACE L. REV. 477, 504 (2016)
(“The Supreme Court typically reviews federal circuit court of appeals’ decisions on certiorari to
resolve either a split among the lower federal courts, an important question of federal law, or a
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previous willingness to invoke legislative history,25 Part II examines Title
VII’s historical enactment, focusing on legislative history implicating
reverse discrimination. Part III then discusses the Court’s development
and refinement of McDonnell Douglas for discrimination claims using
circumstantial evidence. It also explores the Court’s approach to reverse
discrimination by discussing and synthesizing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. and Ricci v. DeStefano.
After laying the groundwork, Part IV reviews the different judicial
doctrines addressing Caucasians’ prima facie case, including the
background circumstances approach and alternatives to it. Part V outlines
the justifications, objections, and resolutions to the background
circumstances approach. After exploring its justifications, Part V
addresses a strong constitutional objection to the doctrine26 and provides a
constitutional resolution.27 Part V recognizes the importance and
reasonableness of the background circumstances requirement but proposes
replacing the judicially-created doctrine to fully insulate Title VII from

constitutional or quasi-constitutional question.”); Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson & Michael S.
Lynch, The Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decision, 60 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 559, 561 (2012) (“Conflict has long been considered one of the primary reasons for granting
certiorari because conflict ‘offends the principle that, under one national law, people who are similarly
situated should be treated similarly.’” (quoting Michael S. Shenberg, Identification, Tolerability, and
Resolution of Intercircuit Conflicts: Reexamining Professor Feeney’s Study of Conflicts in Federal
Law, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007, 1020–21 (1984))).
25. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171–76 (1981) (interpreting Title VII’s
legislative history for sex discrimination and its relationship with the Equal Pay Act); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201–08 (1979) (examining Title VII’s legislative history to
conclude Congress did not prohibit employers from engaging in voluntary, affirmative action);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (reviewing Title VII’s legislative
history to hold Congress prohibited racial discrimination against Caucasians and African-Americans).
But see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749, 1752 (“Of course, some Members of this Court have consulted
legislative history when interpreting ambiguous statutory language. ‘Legislative history, for those who
take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.’ And as we have seen, no ambiguity
exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before us. . . . Certainly nothing in the meager
legislative history of this provision suggests it was meant to be read narrowly.” (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted)).
26. The federal courts are painstakingly silent about the constitutionality of the background
circumstances approach, but those voicing concern have done so tepidly. See Pierce v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We have serious misgivings about the soundness
of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for plaintiffs who are white or male than for their
non-white or female counterparts.”); Tappe v. All. Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 182
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing that the background circumstances approach “raise[s] a serious question
because treating plaintiffs differently because of their race or sex triggers heightened constitutional
scrutiny”); see also Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002).
27. To date, only one commentator has attempted to address the constitutionality of the
background circumstances approach. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1099–118. Other commentators
have neither challenged nor justified this judicially-created doctrine on constitutional grounds. See
Baroni, supra note 15, at 807–17; Bi, supra note 15, at 58–72; Giordano, supra note 20, at 1016–31;
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 71–86; Whiteside, supra note 15, at 428–43.
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any constitutional review. Part VI offers observations about eliminating
the background circumstances approach. It chiefly argues that its absence
will promote Title VII’s purpose, and courts can resolve these claims with
greater confidence under a new regime requiring a holistic assessment of
reverse discrimination claims at the prima facie stage. Part VII provides a
brief conclusion, reminding us that the question in any Title VII case,
irrespective of race, is whether a jury should hear it. Thus, Part VII argues
that the proposed regime coincides with traditional discrimination claims
by focusing on whether there are facts supporting a finding of unlawful
discrimination.
I. TITLE VII’S HISTORICAL ENACTMENT AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
A holistic examination of reverse discrimination claims at the prima
facie stage aligns with a legislative intent behind Title VII to reduce
workplace discrimination against African-Americans (a minority group at
the time of enactment) but not against Caucasians (the majority group at
the time of enactment). As duly enacted by Congress,28 Title VII’s
expansive language outlaws a myriad of discriminatory practices in the
workplace.29 Yet, Title VII neither defines the word “discriminate” or
“reverse discriminate[,]”30 nor does it detail how any plaintiff, regardless
of race, proves a discrimination claim.31 In the absence of such guidance

28. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 457 (1966).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin[.]” (emphasis added));
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.”).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive
Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 295 (1982) (“While the statue’s
prohibitions are sweeping in their language, [T]itle VII does not define the term ‘discriminate’ or the
causal connector ‘because of.’”); Chuck Henson, The Purposes of Title VII, 33 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 221, 230 (2019) (“Title VII does not define ‘discrimination.’ It defines
prohibited practices as ‘unlawful employment practices.’”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 60
(“[T]he plain language of Title VII left some major issues for the courts to resolve. For example, the
statute does not define the phrase ‘to discriminate . . . because of [an] individual’s race,’ nor does it
state whether it would be discrimination under the plain language of Title VII for an employer to favor
minority workers over white employees in order to remedy past discrimination against a minority
group.”). Even though Title VII does not define “discrimination,” the Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified
that an “unlawful employment practice” is any decision where race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin is a “motivating factor.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)).
31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 to 2000e–3.
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from the statue,32 one must ascertain Congress’s legislative aims directly
from Title VII’s legislative history.33 Title VII’s legislative purposes are
embodied in committee reports, floor debates, and numerous statements
from legislators within the United States House of Representatives
and the United States Senate, the latter of which had a “titanic and
protracted” debate.34
A. House Action of H.R. 7152
During the 88th Congress,35 the House took up H.R. 7152, which
contained Title VII, and commenced the process that would lead to Title
32. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)
(“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (quoting Park ‘N
Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985))); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its
language.” (citation omitted)).
33. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Analysis of legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool of statutory construction.”);
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“Legislative history materials are not
generally so misleading that jurist should never employ them in a good-faith effort to discern
legislative intent.”); United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Resort to authoritative
legislative history may be justified where there is an open question as to the meaning of a word or
phrase in a statute, or where a statute is silent on an issue of fundamental importance to its correct
application.” (emphasis added)). The lively debate about considering legislative history for statutory
interpretation is beyond this Article. Compare Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“As I
have said, I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I reject intent of the legislature
as the proper criterion of the law.”), with Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, in THE EMBATTLED
CONSTITUTION 311 (Norman Dorsen & Catharine DeJulio eds., 2013) (“Given that I have argued that
courts should respect Congress’s work product, it will not surprise you that I find legislative history,
in reliable form, useful as I interpret statutes.”).
34. Vaas, supra note 28, at 434–57. When confronted with race discrimination under Title VII,
the Supreme Court has often focused upon the Senate’s legislative history. See United Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201–08; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
Given the stringent opposition to Title VII within the Senate, it is unsurprising the Senate’s debates
provide greater insight into Title VII in comparison to the House. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry
R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1453 (2003) (“The situation in the Senate
was, if anything, worse than the House, given the fact that a filibuster allowed thirty-four senators to
defeat a proposed bill.”); George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 829–30 (1972) (observing that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was immediately met with a filibuster in the Senate and required
compromises for passage).
35. In the 87th Congress and 88th Congress, respectively, the House Labor and Education
Committee issued reports on H.R. 10144 and H.R. 405, both of which were predecessors to Title VII
and addressed the Equal Opportunity Act. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 1 (1963); H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370,
at 1 (1962). H.R. 10144 was stalled by the House Rules Committee and never received full
consideration by the House, but H.R. 405 was incorporated into H.R. 7152 with modifications. See
Sape & Hart, supra note 34, at 828–29 & n.21 (noting H.R. 10144 failed in the House because of
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VII’s enactment.36 On November 20, 1963,37 the House Judiciary
Committee provided its report on H.R. 7152 to the House, which
recognized that the “[m]ost glaring” discrimination within the nation was
against African-Americans.38 Although the report determined “[n]o bill
can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences
of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities[,]” it found it
was “possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which
prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of
discrimination.”39 It further explained Title VII’s purpose is to “eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
or national origin.”40
After issuance of the House Judiciary Committee’s report, H.R. 7152
was referred to the House Rules Committee on November 27, 1963.41 The
House Rules Committee did not clear the bill for floor consideration until
January 30, 1964, and it did so without any amendments.42 During the
floor consideration, over the objections of congressional opponents,43 Title

President Kennedy’s lack of support and opposition by conservative legislators on the House Rules
Committee); Vaas, supra note 28, at 433–36 (observing H.R. 450 was modified and included within
H.R. 7152). Nevertheless, because H.R. 10144 never became law and H.R 405 was modified for
inclusion within H.R. 7152, the reports from the House Labor and Education Committees are not
useful for discerning Title VII’s legislative history. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of
Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 118–28 (2012) (arguing
for various rules when using legislative history, including a rule that one should not rely on the views
of the “loser[s]”).
36. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 1, 9–15 (1963), as represented in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391,
2401–08.
37. 109 CONG. REC. 22,550–51 (1963).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 26, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
41. 109 CONG. REC. 22,856–57 (1963); see also Vaas, supra note 28, at 437.
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-1119, at 1 (1964); Sape & Hart, supra note 34, at 829 n.27; Vaas,
supra note 28, at 438.
43. Within the House, Title VII’s opponents presented three arguments against its passage. First,
some argued that Title VII was federal overreach and “would assume authority over the American
people in a manner unmatched in modern history outside acknowledged dictatorships.” 110 CONG.
REC. 1617–20 (1964) (statement of Rep. Abernethy). See also id. at 1604, 1621 (statements of Rep.
Selden and Rep. Grant). Second, others asserted that Congress could not “legislate people into liking
one another,” suggesting that federal legislation was an inappropriate means to foster racial relations.
Id. at 1700–04 (statement of Rep. Winstead). This general sentiment was espoused by others who
“d[id] no[t] believe new [f]ederal laws c[ould] legislat[e] social equality.” Id. at 1675 (statement by
Rep. Foreman). Lastly, some congressional opponents stated that Title VII was an infringement upon
all citizens’ property rights. Id. Ultimately, these sensational viewpoints were the “losers” of the civil
rights debate, so they cannot carry legal weight when deciding upon Title VII’s legislative aims. See
Schwegmann Brothers. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1951) (“The fears and doubts
of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation”); Nourse, supra note 35,
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VII’s proponents emphasized that it addressed African-Americans’ high
unemployment rates and the low rates of employment among AfricanAmerican professionals, both of which were the inevitable effects of
employment discrimination.44 As bluntly stated by one supporter, Title VII
confronted an unfortunate reality: “[T]he Negro is the last hired and the
first fired.”45
While the House’s focus on African-Americans is clear,46 its
consideration of reverse discrimination claims is not.47 Besides statements
from Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
the House’s debate is utterly devoid of reverse discrimination discussions
under Title VII.48 When opposing an amendment to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, Representative Celler emphasized Title
VII would protect, in addition to African-Americans of both genders,
“white men and white women and all Americans.”49 He further described
Title VII as “all embracing.”50 Representative Celler’s position contrasts
with the bill’s opponents who argued H.R. 7152 was “special legislation”
exclusively for minorities.51 Representative Celler’s contrasting remarks
thus show the congressional intent to protect all individuals.52 Eventually,
after the consideration of amendments53 and a debate, the House passed
H.R. 7152 with a roll-call vote of 290 to 130 on February 10, 1964.54

at 119 (“But losers’ history should generate far more caution: surely the job of judges is not to aid
legislative obstructionists.”).
44. 110 CONG. REC. 1640–43 (1964) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
45. Id. at 2737 (statement of Rep. Libonati).
46. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE BATTLE TO END WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION: A 50 YEAR HISTORY 19 (2014) (observing Title VII was adopted because “it was
consistent with the nation’s ideals and principles” and to alleviate the “disparities that had developed
between African American and white workers”).
47. It is unsurprising the House did not substantially consider Title VII’s impact on reverse
discrimination claims because it was primarily concerned with navigating the procedural obstacles for
passing the bill. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 34, at 1464–68. Tellingly, the Supreme Court
only identified one statement from the House when holding Title VII protected Caucasians. See
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
48. See generally 110 CONG. REC. 2578, 2601–05, 2726–27, 2733–35, 2737 (1964) (statements
of Reps. Celler, Dent, Dowdy, Fuqua, Gathings, Libonati, Roybal, and Ryan).
49. Id. at 2578 (statement of Rep. Celler) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1691–92 (statement of Rep. Harris).
52. Compare id. at 2578 (statement of Rep. Celler), with id. at 1691–92 (statement of Rep.
Harris).
53. See Vaas, supra note 28, at 438–44 (discussing and explaining the diverse amendments to
Title VII, including an anti-communist provision and the addition of “sex” as a prohibited basis of
discrimination).
54. 110 CONG. REC. 2804–05 (1964); see also Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 34, at 1468;
Sape & Hart, supra note 34, at 829 n.27.

1076

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 44:1065

B. Senate Action of H.R. 7152
Despite substantial support in the House, H.R. 7152 was met with
instant opposition in the Senate and required careful legislative
maneuvering for successful passage.55 The Senate’s consideration
included three distinct phases for H.R. 7152: (1) bypass of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and obtaining floor consideration; (2) general debate
concerning the merits; and (3) cloture and passage.56
During phase one,57 the Senate spent weeks debating whether H.R.
7152 should be sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 58 which was
notoriously known as the “graveyard of civil rights legislation.” 59 The
debate largely considered the justifications and objections for
circumventing the Judiciary Committee. Nevertheless, opponents of the
legislation pivoted to their substantive arguments against the bill’s
merits.60 Eventually, on March 26, 1964, the Senate voted to bypass the
Judiciary Committee, which initiated the process for the Senate to consider
the merits of H.R. 7152.61
55. Sape & Hart, supra note 34, at 829 (noting that H.R. 7152 “immediately prompted a major
Southern-led filibuster in the Senate”); Vaas, supra note 28, at 443.
56. Vaas, supra note 28, at 443 (describing three parliamentary phases of the Senate’s
consideration of H.R. 7152).
57. Id. at 443–44 (explaining the Senate’s first phase as securing floor consideration of H.R.
7152).
58. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 34, at 1468–70; Vaas, supra note 28, at 443–45.
59. 110 CONG. REC. 6434–35 (1964) (statement of Sen. Javits referring to the Senate Judiciary
Committee as the “graveyard of civil rights legislation”); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN,
THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 4 (1985) (referring
to the Senate Judiciary Committee as the “graveyard of civil rights legislation”); Leigh McWhite, Mr.
Chairman: U.S. Senator James O. Eastland and the Judiciary Committee, 1956-1978, 86 MISS. L.J.
941, 977 (2017) (“Both sides on that issue regularly referred to the committee as the ‘graveyard of
civil rights legislation,’ and . . . [Chairman James Eastland of Mississippi] consistently referenced his
leadership role during his reelection campaigns in the 1960s as one of the best means of protecting the
segregationist interests of his white constituents.”); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These
Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 967 (2005).
60. See 110 CONG. REC. 5810–11 (statement of Sen. Stennis arguing “[T]itle VII would
constitute a flagrant, unconstitutional, unauthorized, and unwise extension of Federal interference with
and control of private business”); see also id. at 5968 (statement of Sen. Smathers declining to support
Title VII and describing it as the “genocide title”); John G. Stewart, The Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Tactics I, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL
SEGREGATION 219 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (“Before long, however, the southern Democrats
shifted the focus of the debate to more substantive matters and began a comprehensive attack on the
controversial parts of the legislation . . . .”).
61. 110 CONG. REC. 6415–17 (1964); see also Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 34, at 1471;
Vaas, supra note 28, at 444. On this same day, the Senate defeated a motion from Senator Morse, a
civil rights proponent, who wanted to refer H.R. 7152 to the Judiciary Committee. 110 CONG. REC.
6418, 6455 (1964). Senator Morse wanted federal courts to have a formal report from the Judiciary
Committee because, in his view, it would assist in interpreting the statute and in discerning
congressional intent. See id. at 6418. Because of the defeat of Senator Morse’s motion, there is no
formal report from the Senate concerning H.R. 7152.

2021]

The Confusion of McDonnell Douglas

1077

On March 30, 1964, the Senate proceeded with phase two62 of its
consideration by beginning the general debate.63 During the debate,
senators provided valuable statements that help to understand Title VII,
including its scope and how to evaluate reverse discrimination claims. As
one of the first senators to explain the bill’s provisions, Senator Humphrey
of Minnesota repeated Congress’s motivation for enacting Title VII: “At
the present time Negroes and members of other minority groups do not
have an equal chance to be hired, to be promoted, and to be given the most
desirable assignments.”64 Recognizing the importance of employment in
everyday life, he forcefully argued for Title VII’s adoption, a portion of
which is worth fully quoting:
Fair treatment in employment is as important as any other area of
civil rights. What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine
restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does it do
him to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his modest
income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take full advantage
of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of getting a job
where he can use that education? We all know of cases where fine
Negro men and women with distinguished records in our best
universities have been unable to find any kind of job that will make
use of their training and skills.65

According to Senator Humphrey, “Title VII is designed to give
Negroes and other minority group members a fair chance to earn a
livelihood and contribute their talents to the building of a more prosperous
America.”66 Implicating the statute’s scope, he emphasized that Title VII
“encourage[s] hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or
religion.”67 Concluding his remarks, Senator Humphrey emphatically
declared that Title VII is “based on the premise that no man should be
denied employment because of the color of his skin.”68 Although motivated
to legislate because of African-Americans’ lack of job opportunities,
Senator Humphrey’s concluding statements evidence an extension of Title
VII’s protections to all individuals, regardless of race.69 Other senators
62. Vaas, supra note 28, at 443–46 (explaining the Senate’s second phase was its general debate).
63. 110 CONG. REC. 6524, 6527–28 (1964). As just mentioned, even though the Senate’s general
debate began on this date, opponents to H.R. 7152 had already begun attacking the legislation’s
substance during phase one. Id. at 5810–11, 5968 (statement of Sen. Smathers and Sen. Stennis).
Therefore, the general debate of phase two was appropriate for a robust defense of the legislation’s
merits. Vaas, supra note 28, at 443–44.
64. 110 CONG. REC. 6545, 6547 (1964).
65. Id. at 6547.
66. Id. at 6548.
67. Id. at 6548–49 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 6551 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 6549, 6551.
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shared Senator Humphrey’s view about the broad reach of Title VII. For
example, when responding to allegations contained within a negative
advertisement entitled “One-Hundred-Billion-Dollar Blackjack, the Civil
Rights Bill,” Senator Allott of Colorado reiterated that “[T]itle VII . . . is
designed to give every man the right to compete on equal terms for job
opportunities, without regard to his race or religion.”70
As the debate raged, Senator Case, a Republican from New Jersey,71
and Senator Clark, a Democrat from Pennsylvania,72 filed an interpretative
memorandum of Title VII as its bipartisan floor managers.73 Clarifying
that Title VII does not require employers to “maintain a racial balance,”
they explained “discrimination is prohibited as to any individual” and “the
question in each case [is] . . . whether that individual was discriminated
against.”74 Shortly after filing the memorandum, Senator Clark filed a
statement addressing numerous objections from Title VII’s opponents.75
Addressing the argument that “employers will lean over backwards to
avoid discrimination, and as a result will discriminate against other
employees,” Senator Clark explained the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission would encourage an understanding of Title VII’s mandate to
“include[] the obligation not to discriminate against whites.”76
During the debate, proponents within the Senate continued to
espouse their understanding that H.R. 7152 provided broad protections for
all citizens. For example, Senator Gore of Tennessee understood the bill’s
overall purpose as “assur[ing] all citizens of this country the full rights of
citizenship.”77 Further, debating Title VII’s merits against Senator Stennis
of Mississippi, Senator Pastore of Rhode Island continued to echo this
theme: “[I]nsofar as job opportunities are concerned, they shall be
available to all Americans regardless of racial origin, nationality, or
color.”78 Senator Williams of New Jersey addressed the concern that Title
VII required employers to institute quotas for minorities, and he reiterated
Title VII protected Caucasians:
70. Id. at 6037 (emphasis added).
71. James D. Donathen, Note, Unit Seniority Systems and Civil Rights: The Need for Law
Reform, 5 J. LEGIS. 89, 92 (1978).
72. Id.
73. 110 CONG. REC. 7212–13 (1964).
74. Id. at 7213 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 7217.
76. Id. at 7218 (emphasis added). Senator’s Clark statement is interesting if viewed alongside
his blunt assessment about discrimination against Caucasians, which arose during his debate with
Senator Ervin of North Carolina, an ardent opponent of Title VII: “Mr. Ervin. Does the Senator from
Pennsylvania claim that whites are discriminated against in employment on account of their race? Mr.
Clark. That is a pretty loaded question. I must think that over. I believe I can safely say ‘no.’” Id. at
7222 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 9083 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 9793 (emphasis added).
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For some reason, the fact that there is nothing whatever in the bill
which provides for racial balance or quotas in employment has not
been understood by those opposed to civil rights legislation. . . . They
persist in opposing a provision which is not only not contained in the
bill, but is specifically excluded from it. Those opposed to H.R. 7152
should realize that to hire a Negro solely because he is a Negro is
racial discrimination, just as much as a “white only” employment
policy. Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by [T]itle VII of
this bill. The language of that [T]itle simply states that race is not a
qualification for employment. Every man must be judged according
to his ability. In that respect, all men are to have an equal opportunity
to be considered for a particular job.79

Collectively, these statements from Senators Gore, Pastore, and
Williams extend Title VII’s protections to Caucasians, undermining the
central argument of Title VII’s opponents80 that the statute was only
“special legislation.”81 In late May of 1964, Senators Dirksen and
Mansfield introduced an amendment to H.R. 7152, better known as the
Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment, which was a substitute for the entire civil
rights bill.82
On June 8, 1964, H.R. 7152 finally entered phase three of the
Senate’s consideration when Senator Mansfield filed for cloture83 to end
the Southern Democrats’ filibuster.84 On this same day, the Senate
resoundingly rejected an amendment that sought to strike the entirety of
Title VII.85 A day later, the Senate rejected an amendment limiting the
application of Title VII to employers with 100 as opposed to twenty-five
employees.86 On June 10, 1964, the cloture was successfully invoked with

79. Id. at 8918, 8921 (emphasis added).
80. Similar to their House counterparts, the Title VII’s opponents within the Senate also argued
Title VII was only invented for minorities within the workplace. See id. at 9627 (statement of Sen.
Talmadge describing Title VII as being for “special classes of people”).
81. Id. at 1691–92 (statement of Rep Harris).
82. Id. at 11,926–35.
83. Cloture allows the Senate to overcome a legislative filibuster with sixty votes and limits the
remaining time of debate on a pending bill. See Glossary Term | Cloture, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/cloture.htm [https://perma.cc/9EMT-9EYF]; see
also Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 34, at 1470 & n.179.
84. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,922 (1964). Senator Mansfield previously filed for cloture on June
6, 1964, but he withdrew his motion after there was a unanimous consent agreement to establish time
limitations for amendments. See Vaas, supra note 28, at 446.
85. 110 CONG. REC. 13,073–74, 13,085 (1964).
86. Id. at 13,085–93. A few years later, Congress passed the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972,
which extended Title VII’s reach to employers with fifteen employees. Equal Opportunity Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018)); see also Adam W.
Aston, Note, “Fair and Full Employment”: Forty Years of Unfulfilled Promises, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 285, 302 (2004).
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a vote of seventy-one to twenty-nine.87 Senator Dirksen also filed a second
Mansfield-Dirksen Amendment, which replaced the first MansfieldDirksen Amendment and served as a substitute for H.R. 7152. 88 The
second substitute passed on June 17, 1964, with a vote of seventy-six to
eighteen.89 Two days later, on June 19, 1964, H.R. 7152 was finally passed
the Senate by a with vote of seventy-three to twenty-seven.90
C. Return to the House, Presidential Signature, and Legislative Lessons
After surviving the Senate, H.R. 7152 returned to the House with the
Senate’s changes, and the House Rules Committee authorized a vote
before the entire House.91 The House passed the Senate’s version of the
bill with a vote of 289 to 126 on July 2, 1964. 92 On that same day, President
Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.93
There are three key lessons from Title VII’s limited legislative
history implicating reverse discrimination. First and foremost, Congress
passed Title VII in response to widespread forms of employment
discrimination suffered by African-Americans.94 Congress believed that
employment discrimination was an unnecessary hindrance upon the
national economy, and its existence was evident by statistical disparities
between African-Americans and Caucasians.95 Secondly, despite being
motivated to address racial inequalities, there is an overwhelming
congressional intent for Title VII to protect all races from employment
discrimination, including Caucasians.96 Title VII’s proponents repeatedly
stated that it protected individuals within the workplace and used broad
language to argue it applied to “all Americans,”97 “any individual,”98 or

87. 110 CONG. REC. 13,327 (1964).
88. Id. at 13,310; see also Vaas, supra note 28, at 445–46.
89. 110 CONG. REC. 14,239 (1964). Six senators did not vote on the second substitute. Id.
90. Id. at 14,511.
91. Sape & Hart, supra note 34, at 830 & n.30 (observing H.R. 7152 was returned to the House
after the Senate’s passage and the House decided to vote on the Senate’s version of the bill as opposed
to engaging in a conference committee with the Senate); Vaas, supra note 28, at 457.
92. 110 CONG. REC. 15,897 (1964).
93. II LYDON B. JOHNSON, Radio and Television Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 842, 842–44
(1965); see also Vaas, supra note 28, at 457.
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18, as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393; 110 CONG.
REC. 1640–43, 6547–48 (1964) (statements of Rep. Ryan and Sen. Humphrey).
95. See 110 CONG. REC. 1640–43, 6547, 7240–42 (1964) (statements of Rep. Ryan, Sen.
Humphrey, and Sen. Case). Senator Fong of Hawaii lambasted racial discrimination within the
workplace as creating a “fool’s economy” and hindering the United States’ international standing. Id.
at 14,294, 14,297–98.
96. See supra pp. 1075–81.
97. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
98. Id. at 7213 (interpretative memorandum of Sen. Case and Sen. Clark).
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“every man.”99 Further, a congressional intent to protect all individuals
from employment discrimination is a natural inference because Title VII’s
opponents lost the debate after arguing the statute was “special legislation”
for African-Americans.100 Finally, one may consider what Title VII’s
legislative history does not show.101 Title VII’s legislative history suggests
Congress did not consider how plaintiffs of any race should prove their
discrimination claims, leaving that issue for court resolution.102
These legislative teachings inform the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence under Title VII for reverse discrimination claims,103 and
they can similarly provide insight about utilizing the “background
circumstances” approach. With these legislative considerations in mind, it
is imperative to turn to the Supreme Court’s application and interpretation
of Title VII.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPLICATION OF TITLE VII
Legislation is never perfect.104 But federal courts are still equipped
to apply and interpret statutes.105 As the preceding section shows, neither
99. Id. at 6037 (statement of Sen. Allott).
100. As discussed earlier, this Article rejects giving credence to the congressional debate’s losers
if legislative history is employed. See supra pp. 1075–76 & note 43. Yet, the losers’ views are
instructive about whether Congress refused to adopt a position. See generally Andrew Little, Law as
Teacher of Society: Reflections on Title VII After Fifty Years, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 71, 87 (2016)
(“[I]t was well understood at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII that its
legislative history would be a necessary element of later interpretation.”); Victoria F. Nourse,
Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613,
1644–45 (2014) (“Statutes are not made in narrative form, but oscillating political battle. Searching
for legislative context should target disputed meanings with the least effort for the most illumination,
with due attention to [C]ongress’s procedures and most importantly to the question of who won or lost
the debate.” (emphasis added)); Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1298 (2005) (“To be clear, I am not arguing that every scrap of
legislative history has equal importance. As with any other aspect of context, each piece must be
weighed against the others to consider how well it describes the overall context of enactment.”).
101. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2411–12 (2018); Small v. United States, 544 U.S.
385, 393 (2005); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 663 (1980).
102. See supra pp. 1072–81.
103. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
104. See Daniel Abrams, Note, Ending the Other Arm Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 518 (1992); Peter W. Salsich Jr., Community Development–
Some Reflections on the Latest Federal Initiative, 19 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 326 (1975); Elwood Hain,
Milliken v. Green: Breaking the Legislative Deadlock, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 350, 364 (1974).
105. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 293–94 (1989) (arguing that a legislative supremacy principle does not prevent courts from
resolving statutory questions “when there are gaps in the legislative scheme”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1482–84 (1987) (arguing for a
dynamic approach to statutory interpretation that considers “current policies and societal conditions”);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation–in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“I suggest that the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is best
described as one of imaginative reconstruction. The judge should try to think his way as best he can
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Title VII’s legislative history nor text reveals how African-Americans or
Caucasians may prove their claims in federal court.106 Undeterred by Title
VII’s silence, the Supreme Court developed a robust body of law to aid
federal courts in analyzing employment discrimination claims. However,
the Court’s precedents have both caused and contributed to the debate
surrounding reverse discrimination claims.
A. McDonnell Douglas and Its Progeny: The Source of Confusion
The first seminal case from the Court about proving discrimination
claims under Title VII was McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.107
McDonnell Douglas sets forth a framework for Title VII claimants to
substantively prove108 their employment discrimination claims with
circumstantial evidence as opposed to direct evidence.109 In McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff, Mr. Green, an African-American civil rights activist
in St. Louis, Missouri, worked as a mechanic and laboratory technician for
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, an aerospace and aircraft
manufacturer.110 Mr. Green was laid off during a general reduction in
McDonnell Douglas’s workforce.111 He protested against his discharge
and McDonnell Douglas’s hiring practices, contending that both practices
were racially motivated.112 Mr. Green, along with others, first engaged in
a “stall-in,” which consisted of stalling cars on the roads leading to
McDonnell Douglas’s plant and blocking access for a morning shift
into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied
to the case at bar.”).
106. See supra pp. 1072–73, 1080–81.
107. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
108. Id. McDonnell Douglas is primarily concerned with the presentation of evidence after the
motion to dismiss stage. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002).
109. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1984) (“The shifting burdens
of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‘plaintiff [has] his day in court
despite the unavailability of direct evidence.’” (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014
(1st Cir. 1979))); Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Because
employers rarely leave a paper trail-or ‘smoking gun’-attesting to a discriminatory intent, disparate
treatment plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial evidence which
cumulatively undercut the credibility of the various explanations offered by the employer.” (internal
citations omitted)); Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 546 (2018) (observing
courts “slice and dice” employment discrimination claims into direct and circumstantial evidence
cases); Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 919, 954 (2016) (stating plaintiffs proceed under McDonnell Douglas to utilize
circumstantial evidence and not direct evidence). But see Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:
Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 934 (2005) (arguing the
distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence is “no longer appropriate” after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)).
110. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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change.113 After the “stall-in,” a “lock-in” occurred,114 and occupants of
the plant could not leave because chains and padlocks held the front
door.115 Although Mr. Green was aware of the “lock-in,” the extent of his
involvement was uncertain.116 Weeks after the “lock-in,” McDonnell
Douglas issued a hiring advertisement for qualified mechanics, and Mr.
Green applied for re-employment.117 McDonnell Douglas declined
to re-hire Mr. Green because of his participation in the “stall-in” and
“lock-in.”118
Mr. Green filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), arguing his former employer refused to re-hire him because of
his race and civil rights involvement, decisions in violation of 42 U.S.C
§§ 2000e–2(a) and 2000e–3(a).119 The former section is Title VII’s
prohibition upon disparate treatment, and the latter section is Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision for individuals engaging in protected activities
against unlawful employment practices.120 The EEOC did not make any
finding as to Mr. Green’s disparate treatment claim, but found merit to his
retaliation claim and advised him of his right to sue in federal district
court.121 Mr. Green brought suit against McDonnell Douglas for disparate
treatment and unlawful retaliation in the eastern district of Missouri. 122
The district court dismissed both of Mr. Green’s Title VII claims,
reasoning that the EEOC failed to make a determination about disparate
treatment and participating in the stall-in and lock-in were not protected
activities under Title VII. 123 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s findings concerning the lack of protected activities
triggering Title VII’s retaliation provision. 124 However, the Eighth Circuit
113. Id.
114. Id. at 795.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 796.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” (emphasis added)); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.” (emphasis added)).
121. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797.
122. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
123. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797.
124. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1972), rev’d on other
grounds, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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reversed the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Green’s disparate treatment
claim, holding that the court was not jurisdictionally foreclosed from
hearing the claim because the EEOC never addressed it.125 Additionally,
the Eighth Circuit set forth a standard of proof to employ when analyzing
Mr. Green’s disparate treatment claim.126 McDonnell Douglas appealed to
the Supreme Court.127
The Supreme Court first began its analysis by affirming the Eighth
Circuit’s view that the district court was not jurisdictionally foreclosed
from considering Mr. Green’s disparate treatment claim.128 After that
determination, the Court then addressed the “order and allocation of proof
in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination.”129
The Court held that a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. 130

If a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, “[t]he burden must shift
to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee’s rejection.”131 Assuming the employer provides a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its decision, a claimant is then
“afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason
for [the employee’s] rejection was in fact pretext.”132 During the pretext
stage, a plaintiff must show the “presumptively valid reasons for his
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.”133
When applying its burden-shifting framework, the Court found that
Mr. Green successfully demonstrated a prima facie case.134 Discussing Mr.
Green’s prima facie case, the Court noted McDonnell Douglas continued
to seek mechanics after it rejected Mr. Green’s job application and never
disputed his qualifications for the same job he previously held. 135
125. Id. at 342–44.
126. Id. at 343–44.
127. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798.
128. Id. at 798–800.
129. Id. at 800.
130. Id. at 802. Importantly, the Court recognized that the formulation of a plaintiff’s prima facie
case depends upon the factual circumstances and is subject to alternation. See id. at 802 n.13.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 804.
133. Id. at 805.
134. Id. at 802.
135. Id.
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McDonnell Douglas then provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
by stating Mr. Green’s participation in “unlawful conduct against it” was
the reason for his rejection.136 As to pretext, the Court emphasized Mr.
Green needed an opportunity to provide “competent evidence”137 that
McDonnell Douglas’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was actually
“racially premised” because the district court did not permit him to make
the showing.138 Further, the Court opined that McDonnell Douglas needed
to apply its professed rehiring criteria “alike to members of all races” if it
were to prevail at the pretext stage.139
The result of the McDonnell Douglas framework is that it allows
claimants to prove their claims with circumstantial evidence. Direct
evidence always remains a viable option for Title VII claimants to bring
claims of discrimination when they possess evidence supporting unlawful
discrimination.140 But McDonnell Douglas is a useful means to analyze
employment discrimination claims when direct evidence from a damaging
e-mail, phone call, or statement is nonexistent, which is often the case
when dealing with sophisticated employers.141
In several subsequent decisions, the Court refined aspects of
McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework to clarify that Title VII
claimants are not always obligated to provide “additional, independent
evidence of discrimination.”142 For instance, in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court emphasized that demonstrating a
prima facie case of disparate treatment is “not onerous,” but that Title VII
claimants always retain the burden of persuasion of showing intentional
discrimination.143 The Burdine Court further explained that only the
136. Id. at 803–04.
137. Id. at 805 n.18.
138. Id. at 804–07.
139. Id. at 804. McDonnell Douglas is a foundational Title VII decision, but there is almost no
discussion about Mr. Green after his case was remanded. On remand, the district court held that
McDonnell Douglas Corp. showed its stated reasons were not pretext for racial discrimination, and its
finding was upheld by the Eighth Circuit. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501,
503 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff’d, 528 F.2d 1102, 1106–07 (8th Cir. 1976). Thus, Mr. Green’s claim was
ultimately dismissed. See id.
140. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256–57 (1989), superseded by statute on
other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 10-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075, as
recognized in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009,
1017–18 (2020).
141. See Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified
Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 573–74 (2017) (“Plaintiffs
can use circumstantial evidence to carry the burden of proving intentional discrimination without any
‘smoking gun’ proof that the decision maker deliberately decided to discriminate on the basis of a
protected class, such as sex or race.”).
142. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
143. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253–54.
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burden of production shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, and the employer’s failure to provide a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason compels judgment for a plaintiff.144
In carrying its burden, the employer must only produce “some
evidence.”145
After Burdine, in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court
clarified that the rejection of an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason does not compel judgment for a plaintiff because establishing
pretext does not necessarily show intentional discrimination.146 Instead,
disbelief of an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, coupled
with a plaintiff’s prima facie case, may permit a finding of intentional
discrimination if the circumstances warrant.147 Finally, in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Court considered McDonnell
Douglas under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).148 Once again, the Court reiterated that, “[i]n appropriate
circumstances,” it is possible for a plaintiff to prevail by using their prima
facie case and providing “sufficient evidence” that the employer’s asserted
reason is pretextual.149 However, the Court also recognized that a plaintiff
may not always win a case in this manner, especially if there is
“uncontroverted independent evidence” that discrimination did not
occur.150
Despite careful directives about applying McDonnell Douglas, the
Court never explored the prima facie case’s element requiring a “racial
minority” status, which poses a problem for Caucasians.151 But it has
explained that the prima facie case is only a means to infer discrimination
and not an “inflexible rule” that is “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” 152
But that observation is hardly surprising because McDonnell Douglas
emphasized the prima facie case was malleable and subject to factual
tailoring.153 Nevertheless, to the unintended detriment of Caucasian
plaintiffs, the Court has consistently enforced the racial minority or
“protected class” prong of the prima facie case without calling it into doubt

144. Id. at 254.
145. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).
146. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
147. Id. at 511, 519.
148. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138–40.
149. Id. at 147–48.
150. Id. at 148.
151. See id. at 142; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506; Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 n.6 (1981).
152. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–77 (1978).
153. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
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or otherwise questioning its viability. 154 Issues concerning the racial
minority prong eventually reached the Court, and those issues implicated
the extent to which Title VII protected Caucasians or, in the abstract, racial
majorities.
B. McDonald’s Expansion of Title VII’s Reach
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the Court
addressed the possibility of reverse discrimination claims under Title
VII.155 Santa Fe stands for the proposition that Title VII protects
Caucasians from private employment discrimination.156 As this was the
Court’s first reverse discrimination case, the facts are worth considering.
In Santa Fe, L.N. McDonald and Raymond L. Laird were two Caucasian
employees working for Santa Fe Trail Transportation.157 Mr. McDonald
and Mr. Laird, along with an African-American employee named Charles
Jackson, “were jointly and severally charged with misappropriating 60
one-gallon cans of antifreeze which was part of a shipment Santa Fe was
carrying for one of its customers.”158 Eventually, Mr. McDonald and Mr.
Laird were fired, while Mr. Jackson was not.159 After filing a grievance
with a local union and complaint with the EEOC, Mr. McDonald and Mr.
Laird filed suit in federal court against Santa Fe Trail Transportation and
the union for unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981160 and Title
VII.161 The federal district court dismissed both claims when Santa Fe
Trail Transportation moved to dismiss the complaint. 162 The court held
that Section 1981 did not protect Caucasians, and it also concluded that
Mr. McDonald and Mr. Laird failed to state a claim under Title VII
because their employer dismissed them, but retained an African-American

154. See id. at 142; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; see also Furnco Constr.
Corp., 438 U.S. at 576. In the context of the ADEA, the Court unanimously held that an “utterly
irrelevant factor” should not doom a prima face case because the central inquiry of the prima facie
case is whether there exists “evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision
was based on a[n] [illegal] discrimination criterion . . . .” O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U.S. 308, 312–13 (1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)). A prima facie case is generally concerned about creating an
inference of discrimination as opposed to fulfilling a checklist. See id.
155. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
156. Id. at 278–80, 283.
157. Id. at 275.
158. Id. at 276.
159. Id.
160. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it is unlawful to engage in discrimination in the creation and
enforcement of contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2018).
161. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 276.
162. Id. at 277; see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., No. 71-H-891, 1974 WL
10598, at *2–4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 1974).
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employee.163 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court,164 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.165
Writing for the Court as its first African-American member, Justice
Marshall addressed the extent Title VII protected Caucasians from
employment discrimination and explicitly held that Title VII protected
Caucasians “upon the same standards” that are applicable to racial
minorities.166 The Court first reasoned the plain terms of Title VII’s statusbased proscription, which outlaws discrimination against “any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race,”167 are not limited to any
“particular race.”168 The Court next observed that it previously interpreted
Title VII “as prohibiting ‘[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial]
group, minority or majority.’”169 The Court then provided “great
deference” to the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII as outlawing private
employment discrimination against Caucasians “on the same terms” that
apply to racial minorities.170 Lastly, the Court found that Title VII’s
protections for Caucasians was harmonious with its legislative history by
relying upon the interpretative memorandum from Senators Clark and
Case and statements from Representative Celler and Senator Williams.171
For those collective reasons, the Court declared: “We therefore hold today
that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners
in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they
Negros and Jackson white.”172 As to the Section 1981 claim, the Court
held that Section 1981 also protects Caucasians from racial discrimination
in private employment because its reference to “white citizens” only
describes the nature of the discrimination itself, and it “[met] the particular
and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves” who were deprived
the rights of “white citizens.”173 The Court’s first conclusion that Title VII
protects Caucasians is fully supported by the broad language of Title VII’s
status-based prohibition174 and Title VII’s proponents who provide much
of its legislative history.175
163. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 277–78.
164. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 427 U.S. 273
(1976).
165. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 278.
166. Id. at 278–80.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added).
168. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 278–79.
169. Id. at 279 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
170. Id. at 279–80.
171. Id. at 280.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 286–96.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2018).
175. See supra pp. 1074–84.
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Overshadowed by the Court’s central holding about Title VII’s
breath, there is an overlooked footnote in Justice Marshall’s opinion
directly implicating the racial minority prong of the prima facie case.176
Within footnote six, Justice Marshall observed that the “racial minority”
prong was only referenced to “demonstrate how the racial character of the
discrimination could be established in the most common sort of case, and
not as an indication of any substantive limitation on Title VII’s prohibition
of racial discrimination.”177 Justice Marshall’s footnote reasonably
observes that the racial minority prong does not serve as a substantive bar
for reverse discrimination claims under Title VII.178 But, it also suggests,
at least implicitly, that reverse discrimination cases may not be “the most
common sort of case.”179 While his footnote is silent about the specific
formulation of Caucasians’ prima facie case, it seems to theorize the racial
minority prong would not apply to Caucasians because the “racial
character” of the discrimination is different.180
The resulting connotations of Justice Marshall’s footnote are
overlooked by Santa Fe’s central holding that Caucasians are protected by
Title VII “upon the same standards as [are] applicable” to AfricanAmericans.181 The Court did not elaborate about how the “same standards”
apply in reverse discrimination cases, nor did it explain the elements of
Caucasians’ prima facie case.182 Conceivably, the Court used the phrase
“same standards” to mean Caucasians could utilize McDonnell Douglas,
and circumstantial evidence generally, when pursuing Title VII claims,
which is likely the best reading given Justice Marshall’s cautious
footnote.183 But, one could take a literal interpretation of “same standards”
to require Caucasians and African-Americans to have identical prima facie
cases under McDonnell Douglas and essentially ignore whatever the Court
intended by its footnote.184 Both views are merited, but the latter view
sacrifices a holistic reading of Santa Fe. Notwithstanding the proper
interpretation of “same standards,” the Court would not consider another
reverse discrimination case under Title VII until several decades later. This
time, the Court addressed other nuances of the statute.

176. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 280.
182. See id. at 279–80, 279 n.6.
183. See id. at 280.
184. See id.
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C. Ricci’s Recent Approach to Reverse Discrimination Under Title VII
In 2009, the Supreme Court returned to reverse discrimination claims
in Ricci v. DeStefano but was primarily concerned with the relationship
between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims as opposed to
Caucasians’ prima facie case.185 Regardless, Ricci provides the Court’s
most recent approach to reverse discrimination claims and illustrates how
such claims may arise in the future.
In Ricci, the City of New Haven, Connecticut, engaged in a
promotion and hiring process for lieutenant and captain positions within
its fire department (the Department).186 New Haven’s charter established
a merit system, requiring applicants to take a job-related examination and
the relevant hiring authority to fill a vacancy by selecting an individual
who was a “top three scorer[]” from the examination. 187 As stipulated
between the City of New Haven and a local firefighters union, the
examination consisted of a written and oral component.188 The written part
consisted of 60% of an applicant’s score, while the oral part was 40%.189
New Haven hired an outside consultant to administer and develop both
parts of the examination, and, during the examinations’ development, the
consultant oversampled minority firefighters in an attempt to avoid
“unintentionally favor[ing] white candidates.”190
The examinations were proctored in November and December
2003.191 The examinations’ results splintered among racial lines.192 For the
lieutenant examination, there were seventy-seven examinees, including
forty-three Caucasians, nineteen African-Americans, and fifteen
Hispanics.193 Thirty-four candidates passed the lieutenant examination:
twenty-five Caucasians, six African-Americans, and three Hispanics.194
As there were eight vacancies for the lieutenant position, applying New
Haven’s rule of three, the top ten examinees were eligible for an immediate
promotion, all of whom were Caucasian.195 For the captain examination,
there were forty-one candidates, including twenty-five Caucasians, eight
African-Americans, and eight Hispanics.196 Twenty-two candidates
passed the captain examination: sixteen Caucasians, three African185. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557, 563, 576–80 (2008).
186. Id. at 563–64.
187. Id. at 564.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 564–65.
191. Id. at 566.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Americans, and three Hispanics.197 Under New Haven’s rule of three, the
top nine examinees were eligible for an immediate promotion, seven
Caucasians and two Hispanics.198 Given the racial disparities, New
Haven’s public officials expressed concerns to its consultant about the
examinations being discriminatory and imposing a disparate impact upon
minority candidates.199 The consultant defended the examinations’
validity, believing the disparities were attributable to “various external
factors.”200
New Haven officials held a series of tense public meetings to decide
whether to formally certify the examinations’ results.201 During those
meetings, the New Haven Civil Service Board (the CSB) heard arguments
for and against certifying the examinations and entertained testimony from
various experts.202 New Haven’s legal counsel consistently argued that the
examinations’ certification would violate Title VII’s disparate impact
provision, while Mr. Frank Ricci advocated for certifying the results.203 At
the conclusion of all the arguments, “the CSB voted on a motion to certify
the examinations.”204 The CSB deadlocked two to two because of one
member’s recusal, resulting in a refusal to certify.205
The CSB’s decision led to litigation brought by seventeen Caucasian
firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter.206 Accompanying their other
statutory claims and a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause,207 the plaintiffs brought suit for disparate treatment
under Title VII after the EEOC issued their right-to-sue letters.208 The
defendants, including the City of New Haven, Mayor John DeStefano, and
other local officials advocating against certification, asserted they
possessed a “good-faith belief” that they would have violated Title VII’s
disparate-impact prohibition if they certified the examinations’ results. 209
According to the defendants, they could not be held liable for violating
Title VII’s disparate treatment provision in their attempt to comply with
the statute’s disparate impact prohibition.210 Both the district of
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 566–67.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 567–74.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 567–68, 572–74.
204. Id. at 574.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 575.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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Connecticut and Second Circuit granted summary judgment for the
defendants, reasoning that the defendants did not possess discriminatory
intent under Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause.211 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to “interpret[] and reconcile[]” the disparate
impact and disparate treatment provisions of Title VII.212
Proceeding under the assumption that New Haven “rejected the test
results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white” and
engaged in unlawful race discrimination, the Court began its analysis by
describing its task: “We consider . . . .whether the purpose to avoid
disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited
disparate-treatment discrimination.”213 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy first rejected polarizing arguments espoused by the petitioners
and respondents.214 He cast aside two of petitioners’ positions: (1) it is
never permissible for an employer to engage in disparate treatment to
avoid disparate impact liability; and (2) an employer must in fact violate
Title VII’s disparate impact bar if it wishes to argue disparate impact
compliance as a defense to a disparate treatment claim.215 He then rebuffed
the respondents’ assertion that an employer’s good-faith belief that its
actions are necessary to comply with Title VII’s disparate impact
provisions is sufficient to justify “race-conscious conduct” against other
employees.216
Instead of accepting the parties’ arguments, the Court adopted a
middle ground.217 After relying upon and transferring its constitutional
jurisprudence to solve the statutory question before it,218 the Court held
that an employer may engage in disparate treatment to “avoid[] or
remedy[] an unintentional disparate impact,” but only if the employer
possesses a “strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to
disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious,
discriminatory action.”219 In appropriate circumstances, the Court’s
holding permits an employer to engage in intentional discrimination
against one group in order to avoid unintentional discrimination against
another group.220

211. Id. at 563, 576.
212. Id. at 576.
213. Id. at 579–80.
214. Id. at 580–82.
215. Id. at 580–81.
216. Id. at 581–82.
217. Id. at 582–85.
218. Id. at 582–83.
219. Id. at 585.
220. See id.
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After enunciating a completely new standard of law, the Court
proceeded to apply it to the case.221 At the summary judgment stage, the
respondents could only avail themselves of the defense if there was a
strong basis in evidence that “the examinations were not job related and
consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, lessdiscriminatory alternative that served the City’s needs but that the City
refused to adopt.”222 Either formulation is a way in which New Haven
could have been liable for the examinations’ disparate impact upon racial
minorities.223 Rejecting the notion that the “[f]ear of litigation” is
sufficient to invoke the disparate-impact defense, the Court held that the
respondents did not possess a strong basis in evidence the exams were not
job related and consistent with business necessity, nor did they have a
strong basis in evidence to suggest that there was an “equally valid, lessdiscriminatory alternative” New Haven “would necessarily have refused
to adopt.”224 Given those conclusions, the respondents could not avail
themselves of any defense to the firefighters’ disparate treatment claims
because there was no strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact
liability.225 Without a defense to refuse the examinations’ certification, the
Court ordered the entry of summary judgment in favor of the
firefighters.226
Although there are arguable problems with the Court’s reasoning227
and disparate impact claims extend beyond the scope of this Article, Ricci
provides three important ramifications for Caucasians’ disparate treatment
claims under Title VII. First, Ricci permits the utilization of constitutional
doctrines for new legal issues under Title VII, including for reverse
discrimination claims.228 Essentially, federal courts may turn to
constitutional doctrines when Title VII is silent.229 Secondly, at least when
221. Id. at 586–92. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg aptly noted the Court’s decision applies a new
legal principle, as opposed to remanding the case for the principle’s application in the first instance,
and deviates from its normal procedure. Id. at 631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Quite telling, neither the
majority nor any of the concurring opinions addressed her point. See id. at 587–608 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (Alito, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 587 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A), (C) (2018).
224. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587–92.
225. Id. at 592.
226. Id. at 592–93.
227. For instance, the Court provided little, if any, discussion concerning the examinations
consistence with business necessity. See id. at 587–89. Additionally, the Court seemed impermissibly
to weigh the testimony of one of the experts appearing before the New Haven Civil Service Board
(CSB). Id. at 591–92 (“The remainder of his remarks showed that Hornick’s primary concern—
somewhat to the frustration of CSB members—was marketing his services for the future, not
commenting on the results of the tests the City had already administered.” (citations omitted)).
228. See id. at 582–85.
229. See id.
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the Ricci Court was partially composed of now deceased and retired
members,230 the Court was hesitant to adopt a legal standard unfairly
tipping the scale for Caucasian plaintiffs or their employers.231 The Court
seemed willing to provide employers with flexibility to make
employment-related decisions, but employers may not walk free by
disregarding Title VII’s core purposes or hiding behind a “minimal
standard” giving them unlimited discretion to make suspect decisions.232
Lastly, as it concerns the merits of the firefighters’ disparate treatment
claim, the Court endorsed the ability of racial majorities to prove claims
with direct evidence.233 In the case of the Caucasian firefighters, the
undisputed evidence was that New Haven refused to certify the test results
solely because the higher-scoring candidates were Caucasian, which was
explicitly because of race and outlawed by Title VII.234
McDonnell Douglas, Santa Fe, and Ricci are the bedrock cases
guiding Caucasians under Title VII. These cases make clear that Title VII
protects Caucasians from employment discrimination, and they can pursue
claims under Title VII like other races.235 They also support Caucasians’
ability to use circumstantial and direct evidence during litigation. 236
Despite some foundational guidance from the Court, a question remains:
How do Caucasian plaintiffs establish a prima facie case for race
discrimination using McDonnell Douglas? As it remains unanswered by
the Court, federal appellate courts have attempted to provide an answer.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH &
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Court has emphasized that Caucasians have every right to bring
race discrimination claims under Title VII. Yet, the preceding section
230. Since Ricci was decided, Justices Kennedy and Scalia are no longer members of the Court.
See Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx
[https://perma.cc/A5MT-LZG5]. Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh were their replacements, and
neither has voted upon a reverse discrimination case before the Court. See id. Justice Ginsburg, the
dissent’s author, passed away on September 18, 2020. Joan Biskupic & Ariane de Vogue, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg Dead at 87, CNN (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/ruthbader-ginsburg-dead/index.html [https://perma.cc/HT84-4UJK]. She was succeeded by Justice Amy
Coney Barrett on October 26, 2020, who also has yet to vote on a reverse discrimination case. Joan
Biskupic, Amy Coney Barrett Joins the Supreme Court in Unprecedented Times, CNN (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/politics/amy-coney-barrett-joins-supreme-court-unprecedented
/index.html [https://perma.cc/KZ4E-9BXH].
231. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580–82.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 579–80.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 579–80; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
236. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579–80; Santa Fe, 427 U.S. at 280.
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shows the Court has yet to fully consider the implications of McDonnell
Douglas’s racial minority prong. In light of the Court’s silence, lower
courts decided to resolve the inherent tension between being Caucasian
and alleging a racial minority status. In some cases, certain lower courts
created different doctrines that are only imposed upon Caucasians.
A. The Background Circumstances Test in the Shadow of McDonnell
Douglas
At the outset, the background circumstances requirement is only
relevant when a claimant proceeds under McDonnell Douglas. If
Caucasians possess direct evidence of discrimination, they can proceed
with their claim like African-Americans or other racial minorities.237 For
example, in Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that a Caucasian female presented direct evidence of racial
discrimination when her employer terminated her for a shuffling mishap
at a casino and said: “I didn’t want to fire Kim, how could I keep the white
girl[?]”238 Similarly, in Foltz v. Urban League of Portland, Inc.,239 a
237. See generally Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 523–26 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding a Caucasian
corrections officer presented direct evidence when the warden admitted that he terminated her
“[s]imply because she was white and she was in a [B]lack housing unit”). Given the United States’
history, it is unsurprising case law is far more replete with examples of direct evidence provided by
African-Americans. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920,
922–25 (11th Cir. 1990) (observing there was direct evidence of discrimination when one manager
stated: “[I]f it was his company, he wouldn’t hire any [B]lack people,” while the other said, “[Y]ou
people can’t do a—thing right”); Kendall v. Block, 821 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987) (suggesting a
supervisor’s use of the n-word was direct evidence if it was credible); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d
867, 874–75 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding a manager’s decision not to hire African-Americans because
“[h]alf of them weren’t worth a shit” constituted direct evidence). As the United States becomes more
diverse, new cases about other ethnic groups will arise. See Akouri v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d
1338, 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding a Lebanese employee presented direct evidence for a
failure-to-promote claim when the promoted employee explained that the supervisor told him “they
are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and
something like that”).
238. Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 648 650–51 (6th Cir. 2012). In a
perplexing decision, the Fifth Circuit refused to decide whether a supervisor’s blatant racial remarks,
consisting of calling an employee a “white token” and a “white faggot,” qualified as direct evidence.
See Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990). Not only does Young directly conflict
with Ondricko, it also undermines the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, a decision where the Court considered sexist-based comments upon which employment
decisions were made and reliance upon those comments were never disclaimed by the employer. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232–37, 251–52 (1989), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075, as recognized
in Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1017–18 (2020). It may
be time for the Court to revisit the power of “smoking gun” evidence in employment discrimination
cases, including the most persuasive forms of direct evidence and how it impacts employers’ burden
of proof.
239. Foltz v. Urb. League of Portland, Inc., No. CV-99-10-ST, 2000 WL 230222 (D. Or. Feb.
18, 2000).
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federal court in the district of Oregon determined that an employer’s
statement that it “wanted an African[-]American in the position of Director
of Youth and Family Services,”240 a comment made before the Caucasian
holding the position was terminated, constituted direct evidence of reverse
discrimination.241 Additionally, a federal court in the eastern district of
Pennsylvania recently held that a Caucasian applicant, rejected by Thomas
Jefferson University’s Sidney Kimmel Medical College, alleged direct
evidence of discrimination under Title VI242 when an admissions director
purportedly told the applicant she would receive admission if she were
African-American and suggested she obtain a genetic test to inquire about
her minority status.243
These cases are rare.244 Employers’ increased sophistication,
attributed to robust human resource departments and legal counsel, means
direct evidence of discrimination is often unavailable in most run-of-the240. Id. at *10.
241. Id. at *4–5, *10. The Foltz court perplexingly decided that referring to a plaintiff as a “fat,
white, gay guy” was not direct evidence of reverse discrimination because it “did not specifically relate
to [the employer’s] desire to terminate [the plaintiff] because he [was] Caucasian,” was not a racial
epithet, and did not necessarily mean that the employer “harbored discriminatory animus towards
Caucasians.” Id. at *4, *9.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2018). Because Title VI utilizes the same methods of proof as Title
VII, direct evidence cases under Title VI are instructive for Title VII. See Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764
F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d 928, 930 n.1 (10th Cir.
2003); Fuller v. Rayburn, 161 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 1998).
243. Katchur v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 354 F. Supp. 3d 655, 659, 665–66 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
244. See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 2002)
(observing “direct evidence of employment discrimination is rare” (citation omitted)). There are also
reverse discrimination cases premised upon gender using direct evidence. See Carey v. Mt. Desert
Island Hosp., 156 F.3d 31, 37–38 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding a male presented evidence of discriminatory
animus when a female member of a management committee stated that “we live in a patriarchal
society, and men shirk their duties toward child raising[,]” and a female personnel director commented
that “we have different standards for men and women”). Lastly, there is a body of law discussing when
direct evidence is lacking for Caucasian claimants. See Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d
285, 288–90 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding a Caucasian claimant did not present direct evidence when a
college dean stated that “he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority
candidates were available,” but the dean “did not make the decision to eliminate [the claimant] from
consideration”); Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 915–16 (6th Cir.
2013) (holding two statements did not constitute direct evidence of reverse discrimination when they
required the fact finder to infer their meanings); Reilly v. TXU Corp., 271 F. App’x 375, 379–80 (5th
Cir. 2008) (holding an interview panelist’s statement that another panelist “ha[s] a diversity issue” was
not direct evidence of discrimination); Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711,
715–17, 719 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding a discussion between a police chief and deputy chief concerning
the presence of three African-Americans on an older, promotion-eligibility list did not constitute direct
evidence when the deputy chief suggested using the list as a means to “diversify the rank of
sergeant[,]” and the statement required an inference that the police chief agreed with and acted on the
deputy’s reasoning); Markowicz v. Nielsen, 316 F. Supp. 3d 178, 185, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding
a statement from an assistant director of the United States Secret Service was not direct evidence of
reverse discrimination when he said: “[I]f there is a Black or a Hispanic on that qualified list, then
we . . . have to promote them ahead of you[]” and was not the final decision-maker).
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mill cases.245 Therefore, like minority employees, Caucasian employees
must often resort to relying upon circumstantial evidence using
McDonnell Douglas and sometimes show background circumstances as
part of a prima facie case.246
Historically, the background circumstances test originated from the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
1981.247 In Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Mr. Parker, a Caucasian
male, was employed with Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) as a
conductor and trainman.248 Mr. Parker began his employment in 1974, and
he sought a promotion or transfer to locomotive fireman from 1975 to
1978.249 Because Mr. Parker never obtained the position of locomotive
fireman, he brought suit against B&O, alleging it engaged in unlawful
discrimination on three different occasions in 1976, 1977, and 1978.250
Mr. Parker primarily argued that B&O used unlawful affirmative
action and provided illegal hiring preferences to minority applicants.251
B&O conceded it employed affirmative action, which included the
consideration of race and sex, to remedy minorities’ “underutilization”
within its workforce in 1976.252 B&O also had seniority modification
agreements with unions, and the agreements permitted eligible minority
applicants to obtain preferential transfers without the loss of their seniority
status.253 B&O never provided any additional details about its affirmative
action policies, and a copy of the seniority modification agreement was
never obtained.254 In 1976, two African-American workers were eligible
for a preference.255 Two hired women were not eligible for a preference
because they joined B&O after an eligibility date, but the date was
“waived” for their benefit upon their hiring in 1976.256 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of B&O within a terse order.257
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit only considered Mr. Parker’s claims for
1976 and 1978 because all of the locomotive fireman positions were filled
by Caucasian males in 1977, and thus, B&O could not have discriminated
245. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1058 n.114.
246. See Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Lawrence v.
Univ of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1999); Taken v. Okla. Corp.
Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1368–69 (10th Cir. 1997).
247. See Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017–18 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
248. Id. at 1013.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1015.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1013–14.
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against Mr. Parker on the basis of race.258 For the 1976 positions, the court
distinguished the Supreme Court’s opinion in United Steelworkers v.
Weber,259 which concerned affirmative action plans under Title VII, and
held that summary judgment was premature concerning the 1976
positions.260 The court was concerned B&O relied upon its own “selfserving statements” about its affirmative action program, provided no
information about its affirmative action policies, and defended the
seniority modification agreements that were never entered into the record
and only applicable to two employees.261
As to the 1978 positions, the court first observed that B&O did not
invoke its affirmative action program, and Mr. Parker did not attack it. 262
Accordingly, Mr. Parker was forced to rely on circumstantial evidence
using McDonnell Douglas for the 1978 positions.263 After recounting a
prima facie case’s elements for African-American employees, the court
determined that an “adjustment” needed to be made to Mr. Parker’s prima
facie case because he could not fulfill the racial minority prong as a
Caucasian male.264 It reasoned:
Membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on
which the entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated, for
only in that context can it be stated as a general rule that the ‘light of
common experience’ would lead a factfinder to infer discriminatory

258. See id. at 1015.
259. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber, the Supreme Court held
Title VII does not prohibit private employers from engaging in voluntary affirmative action, and it
also set forth criteria for determining when affirmative action plans run afoul of Title VII. Id. at 207–
09. To have a permissible affirmative action plan under Title VII, the Court held that it: (1) must seek
to “eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories”; and (2) cannot
“unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees,” such as requiring the discharge of
Caucasians. Id. at 208–09. The Court eventually reaffirmed Weber and extended its reasoning to
affirmative action plans for women. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627, 641–42
(1987). Neither Johnson nor Weber have been formally abrogated or overturned by the Court, but
some commentators have questioned its continued vitality after Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557
(2009). See Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative Action After
Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285, 330 (2010) (arguing the Ricci Court “likely wrote the
majority opinion in such a way as to erode Weber and Johnson by stealth to make it easier to later
expressly limit the circumstances under which Title VII permits voluntary affirmative action plans”);
Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 242 (2011) (arguing Ricci “left the door ajar for affirmative action
plans under both constitutional and statutory standards”); George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano:
Affirmative Action and the Lessons of Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 113 n.62 (observing Weber
“was conspicuously not cited in any of the opinions in Ricci”).
260. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1015–16.
261. Id. at 1016.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1017.
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motive from the unexplained hiring of an outsider rather than a group
member.265

Enunciating a new formulation to substitute for the racial minority
prong, the court held “majority plaintiffs” could only avail themselves of
McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework if “background
circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual
employer who discriminates against the majority.”266
Noticeably, the Court did not cite to Title VII’s legislative history or
any precedent from the Supreme Court in support of the background
circumstances test, and Justice Marshall’s footnote from Santa Fe267 is
conspicuously absent from the decision.268 The Court even ignored explicit
guidance from McDonnell Douglas emphasizing that the prima facie case
was malleable and subject to tailoring.269 Instead, the court only relied
upon one of its prior cases270—which never mentioned a background
circumstances test and reiterated that Caucasians are protected by Title
VII271—to conclude that background circumstances exist when there is
“evidence of a racially discriminatory environment” against Caucasians.272
The Parker court declined to provide other scenarios satisfying the
background circumstances test and did not decide whether Mr. Parker’s
case met the standard.273 It thus left many questions about the doctrine’s
breadth unanswered. The court would not provide additional guidance
until twelve years later.274
In Harding v. Gray, the D.C. Circuit returned to the background
circumstances test and refined its contours for reverse-discrimination
plaintiffs.275 Mr. Harding, a Caucasian male, worked as a carpenter at St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital (St. Elizabeth’s) in the District of Columbia.276 As a
265. Id.
266. Id. As it concerned affirmative action, the D.C. Circuit declined to suggest lawful
affirmative action creates an inference of discrimination for Caucasian plaintiffs. Id. at 1017 n.9. This
is an important insight because it essentially endorses a view that lawful affirmative action does not
involve an invidious intent to discriminate, while unlawful affirmative action can support such an
inference. See id.
267. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976) (explaining that the
racial minority prong “demonstrate[s] how the racial character of the discrimination could be
established in the most common sort of case, and not as an indication of any substantive limitation of
Title VII’s prohibition of racial discrimination” (emphasis added)).
268. See Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017–18.
269. See id.
270. Id. (citing Daye v. Harris, 655 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
271. Daye, 655 F.2d at 262–63, 262 n.11.
272. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017–18.
273. Id. at 1018.
274. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
275. Id. at 153–54.
276. Id. at 151.
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carpenter, Mr. Harding worked within the carpentry shop of the
construction section.277 There were nine shops within the construction
section and each had a separate foreman.278 In 1986, Mr. Harding was
promoted to carpenter leader, a nonsupervisory position below foreman,
but was required to lead three or more carpenters.279 Eventually, the
District of Columbia, as opposed to the United States, began operating St.
Elizabeth’s and a reorganization took place.280 The carpentry shop merged
with the upholstery shop, creating a vacancy for carpentry/upholstery shop
foreman in 1988.281 Four candidates applied for the position: Mr. Harding;
Ms. Haywood-Brown, an African-American female, who was the
upholstery shop foreman; and two African-American males, both of whom
were carpenters.282 Ms. Haywood-Brown was the only candidate who held
a supervisory position.283
After receiving the highest score from a review panel, Ms. HaywoodBrown was selected as the carpentry/upholstery foreman.284 Mr. Harding
eventually retired after he was diagnosed with osteoarthritis.285 Mr.
Harding then brought suit against St. Elizabeth’s, alleging he was
unlawfully denied the position of carpentry/upholstery foreman because
of his race.286 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of St.
Elizabeth’s, holding Mr. Harding did not allege any background
circumstances by arguing his qualifications were equal to Ms. HaywoodBrown’s.287 Mr. Harding appealed to the D.C. Circuit, asserting the district
court misconstrued his claim because he alleged his qualifications were
superior to Ms. Haywood-Brown’s.288
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by emphasizing, in contrast to an
“ordinary discrimination case,” an inference of discrimination cannot arise
when Caucasians are passed over in favor of qualified minorities.289 As the
court correctly observed from a historical standpoint: “Invidious racial
discrimination against whites is relatively uncommon in our society, and
so there is nothing inherently suspicious in an employer’s decision to
promote a qualified minority applicant instead of a qualified white
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 151–52.
286. Id. at 152.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 153.

2021]

The Confusion of McDonnell Douglas

1101

applicant.”290 It then justified imposing the background circumstances
requirement upon Caucasian plaintiffs.291 According to the court, the
requirement substitutes for the prima facie case’s racial minority and does
not disadvantage Caucasians.292
Harding further clarifies the elusive meaning of background
circumstances. The court separated background circumstances evidence
into two categories: (1) “evidence indicating that the particular employer
at issue has some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against
whites”;293 and (2) “evidence indicating that there is something ‘fishy’
about the facts of the case at hand that raises an inference of
discrimination.”294 To determine whether “fishiness” exists, the court held
that a Caucasian’s allegation or showing of superior qualifications over a
minority competitor is sufficient.295 As the court explained, if an employer
acts contrary to its own interest by promoting an unqualified minority, “it
is more likely than not that the employer acted out of a discriminatory
motive.”296 Thus, Mr. Harding’s allegation of superior qualifications
satisfied the background circumstances test unless he eventually failed to
show a genuine issue of fact.297
In sum, Parker and Harding recognize the historical reality of a lack
of invidious discrimination against Caucasians and grapple with
Caucasians’ prima facie case in that context.298 Both decisions honor
Congress’s primary motivation for passing Title VII, widespread
workplace discrimination against African-Americans.299 But at the same
time, neither decision grapples with Santa Fe’s language mandating the
“same standards”300 apply to Caucasians in Title VII cases; nor do they
rely upon Justice Marshall’s footnote,301 which arguably provides support
for the test.302 Nevertheless, Parker and Harding require Caucasians to
plead and prove background circumstances to withstand a motion to

290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citations omitted).
294. Id. (citations omitted).
295. Id. at 153–54.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 154.
298. See id. at 153; Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
299. See supra pp. 1082–84.
300. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
301. Id. at 279 n.6 (explaining that the racial minority prong “demonstrate[s] how the racial
character of the discrimination could be established in the most common sort of case, and not as an
indication of any substantive limitation on Title VII’s prohibition of racial discrimination” (emphasis
added)).
302. See Harding, 9 F.3d at 153; Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017–18.
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dismiss or motion for summary judgment.303 The failure to address the
requirement can prove fatal.304 As opposed to being “an additional hurdle”
for Caucasians, the background circumstances test substitutes for the
prima facie case’s racial minority prong.305 One can satisfy the test by
showing either: (1) the employer possesses an “inclination to discriminate
invidiously against whites”;306 or (2) there are facts “fishy” enough to raise
an inference of discrimination.307 Either category of evidence shows
background circumstances.308
B. Other Applications of the Background Circumstances Test
The most obvious question about the D.C. Circuit’s test is: What
other factual scenarios or pieces of evidence fulfill the background
circumstances test? Harding makes clear that Caucasians satisfy the test if
they: (1) can show an employer has “some reason or inclination” to
discriminate against Caucasians; or (2) allege or possess superior
qualifications over a racial minority because preferential treatment
favoring a less qualified minority is supposedly “fishy.”309 Building upon
the D.C. Circuit’s initial formulation, the Sixth,310 Seventh,311 Eighth,312
and Tenth Circuits313 have adopted the background circumstances test and
detailed other factual scenarios satisfying the standard. A brief survey is
in order.

303. Harding, 9 F.3d at 153; Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017–18.
304. See, e.g., Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding a Caucasian
failed to allege background circumstances and could not survive a motion to dismiss when (1) his
superiors were Caucasian men and he was replaced with a Caucasian man; and (2) he could not show
anything “fishy” about his termination).
305. Harding, 9 F.3d at 153–54; Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017–18.
306. Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.
307. Id.
308. See Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
309. Harding, 9 F.3d at 153–54. The D.C. Circuit eventually held that a consent decree requiring
affirmative action, coupled with a reluctance to discipline minority employees, may also constitute
background circumstances. See Mastro, 447 F.3d at 852–53.
310. Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 915 (6th Cir. 2013);
Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir. 2003); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga
Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2002); Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d
63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).
311. Farr v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 570 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2009); Henry v. Jones,
507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007); Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2003); Mills
v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 455–57 (7th Cir. 1999).
312. Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 794 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 2015); Hammer v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2004).
313. Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1368–69 (10th Cir. 1997); Notari v. Denver
Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 588–89 (10th Cir. 1992); Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d
1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Without citing any legislative history, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
background circumstances approach with the belief Caucasians should
prove their claims “within the historical context” of Title VII. 314 To
achieve that end, the Sixth Circuit permits a finding of background
circumstances, showing an “unusual employer who discriminates against
the majority,”315 in the following situations: (1) the final decision-maker
is an African-American;316 (2) an employer unlawfully considered race in
past decisions to the detriment of Caucasians, including through
questionable affirmative action practices;317 (3) a statistical comparison
showing a disparity between specific positions within an employer’s
workforce and the qualified labor pool;318 and (4) “evidence of ongoing
racial tension in the workplace.”319 Background circumstances do not exist
when Caucasians hold a majority of the jobs at issue;320 or,
if public sector positions are impacted, when public decision-makers are
African-Americans.321
The Seventh Circuit embraced the background circumstances test to
prevent Caucasian claimants from having a lesser prima facie burden than
minorities and so employers could retain the prima facie case’s “screening
out benefits.”322 Under Seventh Circuit’s view, background circumstances
exist when an African-American boss fires Caucasian workers and
replaces them all with African-Americans.323 They are also shown when
race is considered for employment decisions involving discipline, hiring,
promotions, and work assignments.324 Implicating affirmative action, the
Seventh Circuit has explained that reverse discrimination is “not
surprising”: (1) if hiring authorities are “under pressure” to increase the
proportion of minority groups under an affirmative action plan, judicial
decree, or by internal superiors; or (2) when certain jobs are considered

314. See Murray, 770 F.2d at 67.
315. Id.
316. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n the context of reverse
discrimination claims, that the mere fact that an adverse employment decision was made by a member
of a racial minority is sufficient to establish [background circumstances].”).
317. Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2012); Leadbetter
v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 692 (6th Cir. 2004); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 256
(6th Cir. 2002).
318. Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2003).
319. Treadwell v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 447 F. App’x 676, 678 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Boger v.
Wayne County, 950 F.2d 316, 324–25 (6th Cir. 1991)).
320. Murray, 770 F.2d at 67–68.
321. Toth v. City of Toledo, 480 F. App’x 827, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2012).
322. Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
323. Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2006).
324. Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005).
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“traditional” for certain groups.325 On the other hand, a prima facie case is
not established if (1) Caucasians are replaced by Caucasians;326 (2) there
are no allegations of superior qualifications;327 or (3) one relies upon
subjective beliefs about an employer’s racial hiring without statistical
evidence.328
The Eighth Circuit first enunciated the background circumstances
test in the context of reverse gender discrimination.329 Diverging from its
sister circuits, the Eighth Circuit found background circumstances present
when a female was “substantially less qualified,” there was an interest to
hire a female, and two members of an interview panel “usually” hired
females.330 For race, it held that hiring an African-American and an
internal memorandum expressing an interest in minorities is sufficient.331
To defeat a Caucasian’s prima facie case, an employer can show (1)
Caucasians were almost equally favored for certain positions; or
(2) the hired minority possessed equal, if not superior, qualifications for
the job.332
Reasoning a racial minority status is a predicate for McDonnell
Douglas, the Tenth Circuit determined Title VII’s presumptions are “not
necessarily justified when the plaintiff is a member of an historically
favored group.”333 As such, it finds background circumstances when
Caucasians are minorities within their workplace and have racial
minorities as supervisors.334 By contrast, background circumstances are
not present when Caucasians cannot show the final decision-makers were
exclusively minorities.335 Although it adopts the background
circumstances test, the Tenth Circuit does not foreclose Caucasians’
claims if they cannot meet the standard because it recognizes some
employers may not have a history of discriminating against privileged
groups.336 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit allows Caucasians to also show a
325. Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Preston v. Wis. Health
Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2005)).
326. Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 679 (7th Cir. 2012), overruled on other
grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016); Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347
F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2003).
327. See Gore v. Ind. Univ., 416 F.3d 590, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2005).
328. Marinich v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 45 F. App’x 539, 544–45 (7th Cir. 2002).
329. Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1036–37 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1059 (8th Cir. 2011).
330. Id. at 1037 (emphasis added).
331. Hammer v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 722, 723–24 (8th Cir. 2004).
332. Woods v. Perry, 375 F.3d 671, 675–76 (8th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1059; see also Hammer, 383 F.3d at 723–24.
333. Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986).
334. Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1534–35 (10th Cir. 1995).
335. Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1368–69 (10th Cir. 1997).
336. Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t, 971 F.2d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 1992).
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prima facie case if they “allege and produce evidence to support specific
facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that, but for
plaintiff’s status, the challenged decision would not have occurred.”337 A
plaintiff does not satisfy the reasonable inference test by alleging unfair
treatment338 or if valid comparators are lacking.339
As a final observation, no federal court has held that a formal, lawful
affirmative action plan is a background circumstance raising an inference
of discrimination.340 Excluding lawful affirmative action plans as
background circumstances conforms with employers’ ability to use
voluntary affirmative action under Title VII. 341 Moreover, given that
lawful affirmative action is not discrimination under Title VII, 342
permitting an employer’s lawful policy to support an inference of unlawful
conduct would be beyond reason. If lawful affirmative action plans
supported inferences of unlawful discrimination, employers would be
deterred from using them because they would expose themselves to
liability from Caucasians for enacting such policies. Thus, federal courts
adopting the background circumstances test have correctly decided that
affirmative action is only a background circumstance when employers
questionably use it for employment decisions.343
Naturally, this invokes the question of whether informal affirmative
action can constitute a background circumstance for reverse
discrimination. Unless the informal affirmative action plan is illegal, such
as throwing out test scores in Ricci,344 it is difficult to imagine how an
337. Id. (emphasis added).
338. Lyons v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 130 F. App’x 957, 963 (10th Cir. 2005).
339. Mitchell v. City of Wichita, 140 F. App’x 767, 781 (10th Cir. 2005).
340. Christensen v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 767 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir.
1985) (rejecting a Caucasian’s attempt to use an affirmative action program as a background
circumstance and observing that “[n]ational policy permits the use of voluntary affirmative action
programs to remedy the legacy of discrimination[, and] [f]or the courts to discourage the use of such
programs by treating them as evidence in themselves of the very discrimination they are designed to
eradicate would be improper”); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(declining to equate lawful affirmative action with discrimination against racial majorities and
declining to suggest a lawful affirmative action plan is a background circumstance).
341. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626–33, 640–41 (1987); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979); Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
342. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09; Rebecca K. Lee, The Future of Workplace Affirmative
Action After Fisher, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 613 (2015); N. Jeremi Duru, Fielding a Team for the
Fans: The Societal Consequences and Title VII Implications of Race-Considered Roster Construction
in Professional Sport, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 375, 425 n.322 (2006).
343. See Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2012);
Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2005); Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 692
(6th Cir. 2004).
344. Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 574–75 (2009), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l)
(2018) (prohibiting the alteration of test scores on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin).
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informal, legal policy, which promotes an employer’s autonomy,345 is a
sufficient background circumstance. Title VII prohibits workplace
discrimination.346 It does not require employers to showcase their
affirmative action policies or reasons for internal policy decisions.347
Again, assuming the informal policy is lawful, it still defies logic for a
lawful action to justify unlawful treatment. Accordingly, because federal
courts have refused to qualify formal, lawful affirmative action plans as
sufficient background circumstances, one can assume that federal courts
would likewise extend the same reasons to informal, lawful affirmative
action plans.
C. The Rejection of the Background Circumstances Test and a ProtectedClass Requirement
Unlike the courts discussed in Section IV.B, some courts scrutinize
the background circumstances test and decline to impose the background
circumstances test upon Caucasians.348 The First,349 Fifth,350 and Eleventh
Circuits351 reject altering Caucasian claimants’ prima facie case and only
ask them to prove they are a member of a “protected class” under Title
VII. For instance, in Young v. City of Houston, a Caucasian brought suit
for race discrimination against his employer when his supervisor allegedly
told him that she did not “want any ‘white tokens’ in her department who
weren’t pulling their weight,”352 and he was forced out of the
department.353 Construing the Caucasian’s prima facie case without
acknowledging Parker or Harding, the Fifth Circuit declared that Title VII

345. See Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 493 U.S. 182, 198–99 (1990);
Weber, 443 U.S. at 204–08; see also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1115–16.
346. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a).
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(j).
348. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have declined to either adopt or reject the background
circumstances test. See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659–60 (9th Cir.
2002); Teehee v. Bd. of Educ., No. 96-15072, 1997 WL 312222, at *2 n.2 (9th Cir. June 10, 1997);
Lucas v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit did not endorse the background
circumstances test when an employer did not advocate its application, but it nevertheless concluded a
Caucasian employee presented “sufficient evidence” to meet the background circumstances test if it
applied. See Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 80 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009).
349. Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2000); Akerson v. Pritzker, 980 F.
Supp. 2d 18, 25 & n.2 (D. Mass. 2013); Duchesne v. Banco Popular De P.R., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d
201, 209 n.3, 212 (D.P.R. 2010).
350. Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990).
351. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 & n.15 (11th Cir. 2011); Denney v.
City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11th Cir. 2001).
352. Young, 906 F.2d at 179.
353. Id.
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claimants need only show they belong to “protected class.” 354 The First
Circuit has also stated that Title VII claimants need only show they are
“within a protected class.”355 Both the First and Fifth Circuits declined to
provide any rationale for their implicit rejections of Parker and
Harding.356
Similar to the First and Fifth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit does not
impose the background circumstances test.357 But the Eleventh Circuit
provides reasoning for rejecting the test. First, it adopts the premise that
“[d]iscrimination is discrimination no matter what the race,”358 embracing
color blindness and rejecting all racial distinctions. Secondly, the Eleventh
Circuit relies upon Santa Fe as excluding the concept of reverse
discrimination, and, consequently, a different burden of proof for
Caucasian claimants.359 At least one other lower court has similarly relied
upon Santa Fe to reject the background circumstances test.360
The protected-class requirement is a clear repudiation of Parker and
Harding because it only requires Caucasians to establish their protectedclass status on the basis of race and nothing more.361 Caucasian plaintiffs
must simply allege or prove they are Caucasian in order to satisfy the
prima facie case’s first element.362 As Santa Fe explicitly provided
Caucasians with protections under the Title VII, 363 the protected-class
approach is, at best, a formality.364 Further, under this standard, the
background circumstances test is not imposed because no discernable

354. See id. at 180; Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 824 F. Supp. 677, 683–84 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(observing the Fifth Circuit does not impose background circumstances or allude to an “alternative,
heightened test” for Caucasians).
355. Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a Caucasian male
established a prima facie case of gender discrimination because he was a member of a “protected
class”).
356. See id. at 18–19; Young, 906 F.2d at 180.
357. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 & n.15 (11th Cir. 2011); Denney v.
City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11th Cir. 2001).
358. Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on
other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 971–74 (11th Cir. 2008), as recognized in Smith
v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011).
359. See id.
360. Tappe v. All. Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
361. Williams, 220 F.3d at 18–19; Young, 906 F.2d at 179.
362. See Williams, 220 F.3d at 18–19; Young, 906 F.2d at 179; Akerson v. Pritzker, 980 F. Supp.
2d 18, 25 & n.2 (D. Mass. 2013); Duchesne v. Banco Popular De P.R., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209
n.3, 212 (D.P.R. 2010); Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 824 F. Supp. 677, 683–84 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
363. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279–80 (1976).
364. See Bi, supra note 15, at 53–54 (arguing the protected-class approach is only a standing
requirement); see also Stabler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., C/A No. 5:17-cv-00143-MTT, 2018 WL 4976807,
at *3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018) (holding a Caucasian plaintiff satisfied the protected-class requirement
by alleging he was Caucasian); Thrower v. Yelda Mgmt. Co., No. 5:14-CV-02490-CLS, 2017 WL
735213, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 24, 2017) (same).
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difference between reverse and traditional discrimination exists.365
Essentially, racial discrimination is racial discrimination.366 This
reasoning’s dependence upon color-blindness makes distinctions on the
basis of race per se invalid.367
D. The Sufficient Evidence Approach for Reverse Discrimination
Plaintiffs
There is a middle ground between embracing the background
circumstances test and entirely rejecting it. This solution, known as the
sufficient evidence approach, has only been embraced by the Third Circuit
in Iadimarco v. Runyon.368 Iadimarco involved a Caucasian male’s Title
VII suit against the United States Postal Service when he was denied a
position as an in-plant manager at another facility, the final decision-maker
questionably denied his authorship of a diversity memorandum with his
signature, and an African-American was given the position.369 The court
first rejected its Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ position that
the race of a decision-maker by itself, although relevant, is sufficient to
create an inference of discrimination.370 Secondly, the court refused to
adopt the background circumstances test.371 The court reasoned that the
doctrine is “problematic and unnecessary” because it imposes a heightened
burden upon Caucasians, undermines McDonnell Douglas’s purpose, and
is “irremediably vague and ill-defined.”372 The court instead required the
Caucasian plaintiff to “present sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to
conclude that the employer is treating some people less favorably than
others based upon a protected trait under Title VII.” 373 In other words,
Caucasians need only present “sufficient evidence” under the totality of
the circumstances for a prima facie case.374
On the merits, the court found the Caucasian plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence under the circumstances.375 This included evidence
365. Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Orange Cnty., 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir. 2001),
overruled in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 971–74 (11th Cir. 2008), as
recognized in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011).
366. Id.
367. See Bi, supra note 15, at 53 (observing “some federal courts interpret Title VII to be raceneutral”); Whiteside, supra note 15, at 434 (arguing that adopting the background circumstances
doctrine defies Title VII by treating Caucasian claimants different based on race).
368. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
369. Id. at 154–55, 164.
370. Id. at 159–60.
371. Id. at 161.
372. Id. at 161–62.
373. Id. at 161.
374. Id. at 163.
375. Id. at 164–65.
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that the selected African-American’s application was submitted after the
deadline, considerations and prerequisites were abandoned for the selected
African-American, and the signatory of the diversity memo attempted to
disclaim his authorship.376 Under those facts, the Caucasian claimant
easily showed his prima facie case.377
Similar to the protected-class requirement, Iadimarco represents a
major departure from the background circumstances test. By providing an
expansive means to thoroughly scrutinize reverse discrimination cases, it
honors the purpose of a prima facie case: establishing an inference of
discrimination. Despite its superior approach to allowing a Caucasian
plaintiff to bring a prima facie case, Iadimarco remains overshadowed by
the background circumstances test as numerous jurisdictions still follow
Parker and Harding.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS TO THE
BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES TEST FOR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS
The previous discussion exposes the differing burdens imposed upon
Caucasian plaintiffs for the prima facie case’s first prong. Despite
historical arguments supporting the background circumstances test, there
is noticeable silence about the strongest objection to the doctrine: its
constitutionality. However, regardless of the constitutional question’s
outcome, there is another workable path forward for addressing reverse
discrimination claims that conforms to the Supreme Court’s precedents,
the spirit of Title VII, and reality itself.
A. Justifications for a Heightened Burden on Reverse Discrimination
Claimants
From one lens, the background circumstances test is rooted in
America’s history and the backdrop of Title VII’s enactment. First,
Congress enacted Title VII in response to workplace discrimination
against African-Americans, not discrimination against Caucasians.378
Thus, the doctrine attempts to further Congress’s initial motivations by
recognizing African-Americans as the original beneficiaries of Title VII’s
prescriptions.379 Secondly, Title VII’s legislative history shows
congressional proponents were skeptical about discrimination against

376. Id. at 164.
377. Id. at 165.
378. 110 CONG. REC. 6545, 6547–48 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); GREGORY, supra
note 46, at 19.
379. See Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Caucasians,380 especially since Caucasians benefited from employment
discrimination.381 The background circumstances test likewise
acknowledges the strangeness of inferring discrimination against
Caucasians because they are a “historically favored group” in American
history382 and not a “socially disfavored group.”383 As historically favored
members, it is inequitable to allow Caucasians to continually reap benefits
at the expense of minority groups still facing inequality. Those reasons
give the background circumstances test much historical appeal.
The test also remains attractive because it reflects the current racial
composition of America. Nationwide, data from the 2010 Census indicates
Caucasians were approximately 72% of the total U.S. population, while
African-Americans were approximately 13%.384 Caucasians therefore
exceed African-Americans by approximately 59%.385 Most recently, data
from the 2020 Census reveals Caucasians were approximately 62% of the
total U.S. population, and African-Americans were approximately 12%.386
Caucasians now only exceed African-Americans by approximately 50%,
a 9% drop from 2010.387 Despite their numbers decreasing as a percentage
of the overall population,388 it is unsurprising that Caucasians remain the
racial majority within the national labor force.389 Given population and
labor force statistics, it is unsurprising that Caucasians retain power in the
upper echelons of American society.390 From a social policy perspective,
it is questionable for a racial majority to engage in invidious discrimination
against itself and undermine its own societal power and standing. 391 The
380. See 110 CONG. REC. 7212–134 (1964).
381. See id. at 6547 (statements by Rep. Ryan and Sen. Humphrey).
382. Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986).
383. Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
384. See HUMES, JONES & RAMIREZ, supra note 10, at 4.
385. See HUMES, JONES & RAMIREZ, supra note 10, at 4.
386. Nicholas Jones, Rachel Marks, Roberto Ramirez & Merarys Rios-Vargas, 2020 Census
Illuminates Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Country, U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/08/improved-race-ethnicity-measures-reveal-unitedstates-population-much-more-multiracial.html [https://perma.cc/RF9P-CZ8N].
387. See id.
388. See id.; see also Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 127, 132 n.18 (2000).
389. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., REPORT 1088, LABOR FORCE
CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2019, 1 (2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/
race-and-ethnicity/2019/pdf/home.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK87-NZ39].
390. See Dagmar Rita Myslinska, Contemporary First-Generation European Americans: The
Unbearable “Whiteness” of Being, 88 TUL. L. REV. 559, 571 n.40 (2014) (observing Caucasian men
continue to hold “[w]ealth and power” within American society (citations omitted)).
391. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
723, 735 (1974) (“A White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice;
nor is it likely to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those
of others, or to overestimate the costs of devising an alternative classification that would extend to
certain Whites the advantages generally extended to Blacks.”). Dean Ely argues for a “special
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background circumstances test imposes a heightened burden of proof
because it presupposes Caucasians are unlikely to subvert their own
interests. It imposes a heightened burden as the only means to screen for
discrimination cases that are considered improbable. The background
circumstances test thus attempts to reflect our current racial structure and
the doubtful phenomena of reverse discrimination.
B. Constitutional Issues, Defenses, and Resolutions
The most forceful objection to the background circumstances test is
its unconstitutional imposition of different evidentiary burdens solely due
to race. Despite the historical and social appeal of the background
circumstances test, governmental distinctions on the basis of race are
subject to the equality guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause 392 and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.393
Judge-made doctrines are likewise subject those constitutional
constraints.394
Harding made an implicit attempt to alleviate constitutional concerns
of the background circumstances test by stating it is not an elevated burden
upon Caucasians.395 Dean Angela Onwuachi-Willig argues the test
“level[s] the playing field” between African-Americans and Caucasians
because Caucasians remain favored in employment decisions as evidenced
by statistics.396 She goes further to claim the test is “no[] different at all”
from the racial minority prong.397 However, her arguments ignore the
practical difference the test imposes as an evidentiary burden, and she
never addresses any of the constitutional ramifications of her view.398 A
minority plaintiff does not need discovery to opine about a racial status

scrutiny” of reverse discrimination cases because nothing is “‘suspect’ in a constitutional sense for a
majority, any majority, to discriminate against itself.” Id. at 727.
392. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 307–08 (2013); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
326–27 (2003).
393. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the
equal protection of the laws.” (citations omitted)); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981)
(“This Court repeatedly has held that the Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal Government the
same standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
394. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431–32 (1984); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 267–68 (1964); Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1103 (arguing judge-made law is subject to
constitutional review).
395. Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
396. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 74, 79–80.
397. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 80.
398. See Baroni, supra note 15, at 814–17; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 10, at 71–80.
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and likely possesses proof of it. 399 By contrast, a Caucasian plaintiff must
engage in lengthy discovery with an employer defendant to uncover its
“inclination” to discriminate against Caucasians or to find some other
“fishy” evidence.400 At the front end and even after discovery, providing
proof about a plaintiff’s own racial identity is dramatically different than
providing proof about an adversary’s “inclinations” or “fishy” facts.401
Caucasians must thus provide an employer’s discriminatory intent or show
something “fishy” at the prima facie stage and engage in an early pretext
inquiry, while minorities are relieved of that burden until much later. 402
The different burdens are clear.403
Imposing different evidentiary burdens due to race inevitably
subjects the background circumstances test, or even Title VII, to a strict
scrutiny analysis under the Constitution.404 Peter Gene Baroni boldly
asserts the test is permissible because it furthers Title VII’s purpose: “that
majority and minority plaintiffs are viewed differently.”405 At a minimum,
his position subjects Title VII’s disparate treatment provision to a
constitutional review because it would inherently require a higher burden
of proof for Caucasian, but not racial minorities. One could even take his
argument and use it as fodder to attack all of Title VII by arguing it was
passed to benefit only African-Americans and nobody else.406 Rejecting
his view only questions the background circumstances test itself because
it is the source of the racial distinction, not Title VII. Assuming Title VII’s
effectiveness,407 Baroni’s position should be rejected to confine the
constitutional question to only the doctrine and avoid any constitutional
review of Title VII.

399. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
400. Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.
401. Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–07, with Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.
402. Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–07, with Harding, 9 F.3d at 153.
403. See Baroni, supra note 15, at 813 (arguing Harding is “dishonest” about the background
circumstances doctrine); Bi, supra note 15, at 58–59 (concluding the background circumstances
doctrine imposes unequal evidentiary burdens); Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1104–05 (observing that
different requirements produce different results).
404. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 307–08 (2013); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
405. Baroni, supra note 15, at 812.
406. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1100; see also Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside
Down: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1545 (2004).
407. John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1429–31 (1986)
(arguing Title VII places costs on discriminatory employers and increases total social welfare);
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1081–82 (1995) (arguing anti-discrimination laws
“correct the market failure of discrimination” and are not presumptively inefficient because behaviors
are changed).
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Contextualizing the background circumstances test alleviates
constitutional concerns. Federal courts sidestep constitutional questions
when possible.408 And “[c]ontext matters”409 for discrimination claims
under the Constitution.410 Currently, the background circumstances test is
exclusively imposed upon Caucasians, and there is an absence of case law
applying it to other racial groups.411 However, it could apply whenever a
workplace’s racial majority sues its racial majority employer. This
approach first considers the race of the claimant and then the employer’s
decision-makers or racial composition. If the race between the claimant
and the employer or decision-maker are the same, then the background
circumstances test would apply. If they are not the same, the test would
not apply. In other words, one must decide whether there is cross-racial
discrimination or intra-racial discrimination to justify an elevated burden
of proof. For instance, the test would apply whenever a Caucasian worker,
a racial majority member within his workforce, sues his Caucasian
employer or decision-maker. It would also apply whenever an AfricanAmerican worker, a racial majority member within his workforce, sues his
African-American employer or decision-maker. This would work
similarly for other races. In this context, reverse discrimination is
discrimination occurring between the same races (Caucasian v.
Caucasian; African-American v. African-American, etc.). The background
circumstances test could apply equally to Caucasians and AfricanAmericans if the racial context permits. This contextual proposal reduces
constitutional concerns because the doctrine’s application depends upon a
racial context and not racial differences between claimants.412
If the above proposal is rejected, the doctrine itself would be subject
to a strict scrutiny analysis under the Constitution. 413 The compelling
government interest component of the strict security analysis must be
carefully framed to avoid fundamental weaknesses. Strict scrutiny requires
governmental decisions to be narrowly tailored in furtherance of a
compelling government interest.414 Conceptually, it is difficult to
determine the compelling government interest because the background
408. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7 (1993); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998).
409. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
410. Id.
411. See Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986); Murray v.
Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
412. Professor Sullivan presents a similar argument about reframing the background
circumstances test but does not suggest it precludes a constitutional review. See Sullivan, supra note
15, at 1107–08.
413. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1102–03.
414. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
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circumstances test is a judge-made doctrine addressing a burden of
proof.415 It is not a race-based decision concerning social policy from
either an executive or legislative branch or a public institution. 416
Admitting this is an “odd” way to evaluate a judge-made doctrine,417
Professor Charles A. Sullivan—the only commentator tackling this
issue—argues diversity and eliminating private discrimination may be
compelling governmental interests for the doctrine.418 Professor Sullivan’s
proposed argument overlooks the nature of the governmental actor making
the racial distinction and lumps all governmental actors together.419 His
argument also rests upon the extraordinary assumption that federal courts
are legally capable of creating and bestowing burdens and privileges upon
private actors through racial classifications, much like legislative or
executive directives.420 If federal courts are actually incapable of doing
so,421 Professor Sullivan’s compelling interests fail outright because the
federal judiciary could not even have an interest in remedying private
employers’ internal diversity or eliminating private discrimination. Under
this argument, such interests dangerously venture beyond federal courts’
limited jurisdiction.422
Instead, federal courts arguably have a compelling interest in
creating burdens of proof to manage judicial efficiency essential to its
democratic duties, which justifies the initial creation of McDonnell
Douglas and gives credence to the background circumstances test.423 The
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a compelling governmental interest in
managing the electoral process.424 It has also recognized a compelling
interest in the fair administration of justice and functioning of the court

415. See Livingston, 802 F.2d at 1252; Murray, 770 F.2d at 67; Harding, 9 F.3d at 153–54.
416. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
417. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1103.
418. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1110–13.
419. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1110–13.
420. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1103.
421. This argument promotes a judicial-restraint philosophy, promoting a limited role of federal
courts to certain controversies. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A
Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1981). Professor Stone provides an
informative discussion about the selective use of judicial activism and judicial restraint by
conservatives and liberals. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 490–98 (2012).
422. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,
which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” (citations omitted)).
423. See United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 662, 669 (11th Cir. 2014); Kirby v. Attorney Gen.
for N.M., No. CIV 08-0887 JB/DJS, 2010 WL 11523886, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 30, 2010).
424. Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) (citation
omitted).
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system.425 Even though governmental efficiency has constitutional
limits,426 these compelling interests inherently involve managing an
internal process going to the heart of democratic governance. It would thus
follow that federal courts have a similar compelling interest in formulating
burdens of proof, allowing them to efficiently assess, manage, and screen
cases as part of a functioning democracy.427 The background
circumstances test could be justified under this view because it allows
courts to carefully scrutinize reverse discrimination claims that are
unlikely to occur within America’s current social structure.
Assuming there is a compelling government interest, whatever that
may be, the constitutional inquiry would still require the doctrine to be
narrowly tailored.428 One would need to show “‘race-neutral alternatives’
that are both ‘available’ and ‘workable’ ‘do not suffice.’”429 Professor
Sullivan first admits the narrowly tailored requirement is “problematic.”430
He then claims that expert testimony is a less restrictive alternative to the
doctrine.431 Yet, there are still other less restrictive alternatives besides
expert testimony. As recognized by Professor Sullivan,432 and eventually
argued here,433 Iadimarco’s sufficient evidence approach, which examines
all of the circumstances, does not impose a higher burden upon
Caucasians.434 Although it is unappealing to adopt, 435 the protected-class
approach, which eviscerates the racial minority prong, is also an option.436
Thus, there are at least two doctrines focusing on an inference of
discrimination without making any racial distinctions. Normally, this
would end the inquiry, and the background circumstances test would be
declared unconstitutional.437
Professor Sullivan goes further, suggesting that to survive strict
scrutiny one could argue the background circumstances test is narrowly
tailored as possible because its higher burden targets the infrequency of

425. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).
426. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 962 (1988).
427. Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2018).
428. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
429. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (citation omitted).
430. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1113.
431. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1114.
432. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1118–19.
433. See infra Part V.C.
434. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158–61 (3d Cir. 1999).
435. See infra Part V.C.
436. See Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Orange Cnty., 256 F.3d 1095, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 2001),
overruled in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 971–74 (11th Cir. 2008), as
recognized in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011).
437. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270–75 (2003).
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discrimination against Caucasians.438 But this argument changes the nature
of the compelling interest to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement.
Professor Sullivan’s compelling interest becomes screening for the rare
phenomena of reverse discrimination and is no longer diversity or the
elimination of private workplace discrimination.439 It is hard to fathom
how a higher burden helps to reduce, let alone eliminate, private workplace
discrimination because it would presumably disadvantage some claims
from even being heard.440 Likewise, it is equally difficult to imagine how
imposing a higher burden on Caucasians relates to achieving diversity. The
background circumstances test does not seek to diversify a workforce, a
practice which is not considered discriminatory. Instead, it is concerned
with creating an inference of intentional discrimination after litigation has
started. Essentially, it is designed to solve cases, not to benefit private
employers’ workforces. To argue the background circumstances is
narrowly tailored, in and of itself, must necessarily change the compelling
interest at stake. Professor Sullivan’s proposed argument thus
accomplishes an end by ignoring the initial means employed to achieve it.
Admittedly, the constitutional solutions are unsatisfying, especially
with the Court’s growing emphasis on colorblindness.441 The easiest way
to avoid these constitutional pitfalls is to limit the background
circumstances requirement to all forms of intra-racial discrimination. This
would stop the theoretical exercise of defending the requirement on
constitutional grounds.
C. A New Path Forward for Reverse Discrimination Claims
The background circumstances test has normative appeal and is
rooted in reality, but it makes Title VII a target for legitimate constitutional
attacks. Notwithstanding severability,442 the strongest way to fully insulate
Title VII from any constitutional review would be to eliminate the
background circumstances test. Instead of alleging or proving background
438. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1114.
439. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 1112–14.
440. See John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1723 n.27 (2008)
(observing parties with the burden of proof are disadvantaged).
441. See generally Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (“Of course, the ‘moral
imperative of race neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause,’ and racial
classifications are permitted only ‘as a last resort.’” (citation omitted)).
442. The severability doctrine permits a federal court to invalidate only a portion of a statute it
deems unconstitutional as opposed to invalidating the entire statute or an entire portion of a statutory
section. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585–87 (2012); Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931–35 (1983). Were the background circumstances
test mandated by Title VII, at the minimum, Title VII’s disparate treatment provision could be subject
to a constitutional attack. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 585–87.

2021]

The Confusion of McDonnell Douglas

1117

circumstances, a reverse discrimination plaintiff should be able to prove a
prima facie case by presenting sufficient evidence to infer racial
discrimination under the circumstances.443 Put differently, the prima facie
case for reverse discrimination claims should be subject to a totality of the
circumstances standard supported by sufficient evidence.444 Of course,
some facts might be more important than others, but the racial context is
always examined. This formulation avoids the constitutional question,
honors the prima face case’s purpose, and uses constitutional
jurisprudence as suggested by Ricci.
A holistic assessment of a prima facie case does not heighten any
burden upon Caucasians, thereby avoiding constitutional concerns. The
prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination and its “precise
requirements . . . can vary depending on the context.”445 It ensures there
are sufficient facts to impose liability upon an employer if it declines to
explain conduct that otherwise seems discriminatory.446 Once, the
Supreme Court stated the prima facie case concerns whether “an employee
has adduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of a
discriminatory motive.”447 This burden is never “onerous” for four primary
reasons.448 First, as opposed to the amorphous background circumstances
test, requiring Caucasians to provide sufficient evidence under the
circumstances is explicitly sanctioned and used by precedent.449 Secondly,
it ensures that a prima facie case is not “onerous”450 by not requiring a
claimant to address an employer’s motive or pretext at the forefront.451
Third, it best serves the prima facie case’s aims by focusing on an
inference of discrimination under a set of facts, avoiding the “rigid,
mechanized, or ritualistic” test the Court has cautioned against and is
currently employed by the background circumstances’ two prongs.452
Lastly, it assists claimants possessing sufficient evidence of a
discriminatory motive, but evidence failing to satisfy the background
circumstances’ two prongs.
443. See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158–61 (3d Cir. 1999).
444. See id.
445. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
446. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 (1993); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978); see also O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
312–13 (1996).
447. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 162 n.10 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
448. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
449. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312–13; Harris, 444 U.S. at 162 n.10.
450. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
451. See supra pp. 1111–13.
452. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–77 (1978); see also Sullivan, supra note
15, at 1129 (stating the sufficient evidence approach uses a “holistic assessment” of evidence).

1118

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 44:1065

The Court’s decision in Ricci showed its willingness to adopt
constitutional standards for Title VII’s unanswered questions.453 Under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court has placed the burden of proof upon
public employers and universities, requiring them to produce “sufficient
evidence” justifying their affirmative action programs.454 Similarly, in the
context of a prosecutor’s racial use of preemptory strikes, the Court has
permitted criminal defendants to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by using a “wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of
the proffered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose.’”455 A sufficient evidence formulation is no novelty. If the Court
is still willing to transfer constitutional rules into Title VII jurisprudence
as it did in Ricci,456 then a sufficient evidence approach has constitutional
roots and may be utilized for evaluating Caucasians’ prima facie case
without creating constitutional questions.
Policy wise, a sufficient evidence formulation will aid racial
minorities in the future. Statistics predict racial minorities will eventually
become racial majorities within the United States by 2045.457 Caucasians
will thus become racial minorities by 2045.458 The racial minority prong
will inevitably create issues because, disregarding our historical
perceptions, current racial minorities will not be racial minorities in the
future. If the background circumstances test is concerned with
discrimination against racial majorities,459 current racial minorities will be
subject to the background circumstances test once obtaining a majority
status. A sufficient evidence approach anticipates the future. Regardless
of the demographic winds, a sufficient evidence doctrine examines all of
the facts, including the racial context, and would not subject current racial
minorities to the background circumstances test’s inflexible prongs.
Instead, their prima facie cases will be holistically examined.
One could propose eliminating McDonnell Douglas’s racial minority
prong and opt for the protected-class requirement, but this alternative is
problematic for several reasons. First, the protected-class prong has been
453. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582–85 (2009).
454. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
455. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
94 (1986)).
456. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582–85.
457. JONATHAN VESPA, LAUREN MEDINA & DAVID M. ARMSTRONG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
P25-1144, DEMOGRAPHIC TURNING POINTS FOR THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR
2020 TO 2060, 6–7 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020
/demo/p25-1144.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA4V-AMPK].
458. Id.
459. See Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.,
652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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sparingly applied by the Court.460 Secondly, it treats a claimant’s racial
characteristic as immaterial461 and as a standing formality.462 Only a
careless attorney forgetting to plead or prove a client’s race would fail it.
Lastly, this option cherry picks the application of color-blindness. The
protected-class prong initially ignores a claimant’s race, but then realizes
race matters for race discrimination claims, especially if racial
comparisons are utilized. In contrast, the sufficient evidence approach
honestly examines the facts when determining if an inference of
discrimination arises.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING THE BACKGROUND
CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH
Eliminating the background circumstances test would have practical
consequences for reverse discrimination plaintiffs. Most obviously, its
elimination would impact how the federal courts would formulate their
prima facie cases. Rejecting the background circumstances test would lead
to two other important outcomes: (1) preserving Title VII’s focus on
individual cases; and (2) enhanced judicial confidence when adjudicating
reverse discrimination claims.
A. Preserving Title VII’s Focus
Rooting out intentional discrimination within the workplace by
examining individual claims is one of the chief lessons gleaned from Title
VII’s legislative history 463 and subsequent case law.464 Again, Baroni
asserts that Title VII’s purpose is to treat majority and minority plaintiffs
differently.465 But his questionable conclusion fails to cite a single page of
the Congressional Record466 and ignores the legislative events surrounding
Title VII’s enactment. Although Congress was unquestionably motivated
by the injustices of the 1960s,467 Congress passed Title VII over the
460. Compare Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015) (using a
protected-class prong), with Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981) (not
referencing a protected-class prong), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (same).
461. See E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class
in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 452, 491 (1998) (arguing the protectedclass requirement is a standing inquiry and ignores differences between privileged and unprivileged
identities).
462. Bi, supra note 15, at 53–54.
463. See supra pp. 1078, 1080–81.
464. City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (“[Title VII’s]
focus on the individual is unambiguous.”).
465. Baroni, supra note 14, at 812.
466. Baroni, supra note 14, at 812.
467. See supra pp. 1074, 1077–79.
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objections of congressional opponents decrying it as “special legislation,”
repeatedly emphasizing Title VII’s protections extended to all racial
groups.468 Accepting Baroni’s position would honor the congressional
losers’ rejected position469 and subject Title VII to a constitutional attack
because the statute would require distinctions on the basis of race.470
Baroni’s position places Title VII in unnecessary jeopardy. To avoid such
consequences, Title VII’s core promise should be framed as evaluating
cases individually to uncover unlawful discrimination.471
The background circumstances test limits individual assessments of
reverse discrimination claims if Caucasians cannot satisfy either prong of
the test’s current formulation but otherwise possesses evidence of
discrimination. For instance, suppose that a new employer, owned by a
Caucasian, opens a business within a Caucasian area. Given the
employer’s novelty, there would be no evidence showing its past
“inclinations” to discriminate against Caucasians or any racial group.
Thus, the first prong of the background circumstances test could not be
met. Next, imagine a qualified Caucasian applicant interviews with a
three-person panel that is majority Caucasian472 but is passed over for an
equally qualified African-American from the area. At first glance, nothing
seems “fishy” given the panel’s makeup and both candidates are qualified.
Now imagine that the Caucasian applicant interviews for a second time,
with the same panel, and is again passed over for a qualified AsianAmerican. The employer’s workforce is still majority Caucasian given the
demographics of the labor market. From one perspective, there is nothing
fishy if the panel is still predominately Caucasian, along with the
employer’s majority-Caucasian workforce. However, if one considers this
individual Caucasian was passed over twice, and the employer has no
affirmative action policy, the circumstances may create a prima facie case
for this individual applicant. The background circumstances test would
prohibit an individual assessment of the Caucasian’s claim. A sufficient
evidence standard would at least ensure the Caucasian applicant’s claim is
given an individual assessment for a prima facie case, furthering Title
VII’s core promise.

468. See supra pp. 1080–81.
469. See supra p. 1082 and note 100.
470. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 307–08 (2013); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
471. See supra pp. 1080–81.
472. Imagine the panel consists of two Caucasians and one African-American.
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B. Enhancing Judicial Confidence
The background circumstances test currently depends upon personal
and societal judgments that unquestionably vary from judge to judge,
while a sufficient evidence approach encourages fairness by considering
and weighing a prima facie case’s facts.473 Under the background
circumstances test, what is “fishy” invariably depends on a judge’s
background and beliefs. What may be “fishy” to one may not be to
another.474 The background circumstances test thus abandons objectivity
since it heavily relies upon judges’ subjective intuitions. By contrast, the
sufficient evidence approach provides judges with discretion to decide
which facts carry the day,475 but a Caucasian plaintiff is the one who
initially proffers the facts for consideration.476 Examining all of the
circumstances for sufficient evidence would likely increase judicial
confidence because judges would not have to subjectively determine
“fishiness” and could rather focus on objective facts.
The sufficient evidence approach also mirrors other judicial
doctrines that lower courts already employ, making it judicially
administrable.477 For example, federal courts routinely examine whether
there is sufficient evidence under the totality of circumstances to
determine whether an individual is an employee under federal
employment statutes.478 They also use this test for Title VII claims
implicating a hostile work environment and/or sexual harassment.479
Federal courts employ a totality of the circumstances test under the Fourth
Amendment to decide if police officers possess a reasonable suspicion to

473. Bi proposes an elaborate “combination of factors” approach, which essentially asks courts
to examine numerous factors for an inference of discrimination. See Bi, supra note 15, at 71–72. A
sufficient evidence approach examining the circumstances is much simpler than Bi’s complicated
proposal. See id. 68–72.
474. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination,
Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 313, 344–51 (2012) (finding AfricanAmerican judges dismiss employment discrimination cases at lower rates than Caucasian judges).
475. See generally Ashley G. Chrysler, Comment, All Work, No Pay: The Crucial Need for the
Supreme Court to Review Unpaid Internship Classifications Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1561, 1605 n.310 (2014) (arguing a totality of the circumstances test gives
judges “almost complete discretion” to determine how to examine factors and what factors to
examine).
476. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
477. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–69 (2006).
478. See, e.g., Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d 522, 528–29 (5th Cir. 2004) (employing
a totality of the circumstances test to determine volunteer status under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the totality of the
circumstances for employment status under Title VII).
479. See, e.g., Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 2014);
Erickson v. Wisc. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195
F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999).
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engage in investigatory stops.480 As mentioned previously, they have also
used this standard under the Equal Protection Clause.481 There is no
indication the concept of “fishiness” aids federal courts to decide disputes.
Given federal courts’ familiarity with evaluating factual circumstances,
judicial confidence in adjudicating reverse discrimination claims would
likely enhance, especially when evidence is considered during summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
Title VII’s promise to eradicate workplace discrimination is essential
to foster equal opportunities for all. To enforce that promise, federal courts
must vigilantly remember that every Title VII claimant must proffer
circumstantial or direct evidence supporting a finding of intentional
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework is an
important tool for plaintiffs, regardless of race, to prove their
discrimination claims with circumstantial evidence and to reach a jury, the
ultimate arbiter of whether there was unlawful discrimination. Using the
background circumstances test in that inquiry—despite its valid
observations—possesses the ability to raise gut-wrenching questions
about Title VII’s constitutionality. This Article should not be
misunderstood as arguing that the background circumstances test is
normatively flawed or based upon a misconception of reality. Instead, it
simply recognizes that accepting the doctrine comes at a cost—namely,
the possibility of subjecting Title VII, or at least its status-based
prescription, to a constitutional review. To avoid those constitutional
questions in their entirety, eliminating or reforming the standard provides
an easy solution. A reformation would include a totality of the
circumstances and sufficiency of the evidence standard. Either option
secures the continued viability of Title VII by fully insulating it from
constitutional review. To be sure, reverse discrimination claims would
remain subject to the rigors of McDonnell Douglas’s pretext stage.
Accordingly, like traditional discrimination claims, the success or failure
of reverse discrimination claims would ultimately depend upon whether
the particular facts support a finding of unlawful discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas’s confusion about reverse discrimination claims
has caused consternation among the federal appellate courts. Although
arguably undesirable from critics, eliminating or reforming the
background circumstances approach would signal a continued
480. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2014); United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
481. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 314 (2013); Johnson v. California, 545
U.S. 162, 169 (2005); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
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commitment to examining discrimination cases on their merits, which
avoids constitutionally scrutinizing an important piece of civil rights
legislation. Further, it would evade a tense debate, in an already polarized
nation, about the various experiences, expectations, and norms concerning
racial relations within the workplace. But given the recent events sparking
civil demonstrations about the treatment of African-Americans at the
hands of law enforcement, treatment which has no doubt existed for
centuries, perhaps this is a long overdue reckoning, and the background
circumstances test is worth fully defending.

